Ramp secret sharing with cheater identification in presence of rushing cheaters

IF 0.1 Q4 MATHEMATICS Groups Complexity Cryptology Pub Date : 2019-10-16 DOI:10.1515/gcc-2019-2006
Jyotirmoy Pramanik, A. Adhikari
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

Abstract Secret sharing allows one to share a piece of information among n participants in a way that only qualified subsets of participants can recover the secret whereas others cannot. Some of these participants involved may, however, want to forge their shares of the secret(s) in order to cheat other participants. Various cheater identifiable techniques have been devised in order to identify such cheaters in secret sharing schemes. On the other hand, Ramp secret sharing schemes are a practically efficient variant of usual secret sharing schemes with reduced share size and some loss in security. Ramp secret sharing schemes have many applications in secure information storage, information-theoretic private information retrieval and secret image sharing due to producing relatively smaller shares. However, to the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any cheater identifiable ramp secret sharing scheme. In this paper we define the security model for cheater identifiable ramp secret sharing schemes and provide two constructions for cheater identifiable ramp secret sharing schemes. In addition, the second construction is secure against rushing cheaters who are allowed to submit their shares during secret reconstruction after observing other participants’ responses in one round. Also, we do not make any computational assumptions for the cheaters, i.e., cheaters may be equipped with unlimited time and resources, yet, the cheating probability would be bounded above by a very small positive number.
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坡道秘密共享与作弊者识别在匆忙的作弊者面前
摘要秘密共享允许在n个参与者之间共享一条信息,只有符合条件的参与者子集才能恢复该秘密,而其他参与者则不能。然而,其中一些参与者可能想要伪造他们的秘密份额,以欺骗其他参与者。为了在秘密共享方案中识别这些作弊者,已经设计了各种识别作弊者的技术。另一方面,Ramp秘密共享方案是常规秘密共享方案的一种实际有效的变体,它减小了共享大小,但在安全性上有一定的损失。斜坡秘密共享方案由于产生相对较小的共享,在安全信息存储、信息论私有信息检索和秘密图像共享等方面有着广泛的应用。然而,据我们所知,不存在任何可识别作弊者的斜坡秘密共享方案。本文定义了骗子可识别匝道秘密共享方案的安全模型,并给出了骗子可识别匝道秘密共享方案的两种结构。此外,第二次构建是安全的,防止匆忙的作弊者在观察其他参与者的反应后,在秘密重建期间提交自己的份额。同时,我们没有对作弊者做任何计算上的假设,即作弊者可能拥有无限的时间和资源,但是作弊的概率会被一个非常小的正数所限制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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