{"title":"NGOs, the Internet and International Economic Policy Making: The Failure of the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment","authors":"J. Kurtz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.364900","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The research question posed by this article is how the Internet has affected the debate on whether to provide non-governmental organisations (\"NGOs\") with access to trade and investment negotiations. The article begins by summarising the key arguments for and against increased NGO participation. Within this debate, international lawyers have largely ignored the question of whether the Internet pushes the debate in either direction. This article offers a contribution to this gap in the analysis. The methodology employed in examining this question is that of a case study of the failed negotiations among the member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (\"OECD\") from 1995 to 1998 towards the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (\"MAI\"). The MAI was chosen because the OECD approach to negotiations was characterised by low levels of transparency and little scope for NGO participation. Further, the very active (and to some extent successful) campaign by NGOs against the MAI relied heavily on the Internet. The article finds that the MAI case study pushes the debate slightly in favour of greater NGO access to negotiations. Of itself, the Internet does not overcome the proper concerns of opponents based on questions of representativeness and accountability of NGOs. However, the article argues that these problems are counterbalanced to some degree by the expanded ability of electronically networked NGOs to assist in the sensitive process of conferring (or opposing) public approval and hence legitimacy for new agreements. The article concludes with some modest suggestions for greater transparency in negotiations as a response to these research findings.","PeriodicalId":42243,"journal":{"name":"Melbourne Journal of International Law","volume":"48 1","pages":"213"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2003-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Melbourne Journal of International Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.364900","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Abstract
The research question posed by this article is how the Internet has affected the debate on whether to provide non-governmental organisations ("NGOs") with access to trade and investment negotiations. The article begins by summarising the key arguments for and against increased NGO participation. Within this debate, international lawyers have largely ignored the question of whether the Internet pushes the debate in either direction. This article offers a contribution to this gap in the analysis. The methodology employed in examining this question is that of a case study of the failed negotiations among the member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") from 1995 to 1998 towards the Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI"). The MAI was chosen because the OECD approach to negotiations was characterised by low levels of transparency and little scope for NGO participation. Further, the very active (and to some extent successful) campaign by NGOs against the MAI relied heavily on the Internet. The article finds that the MAI case study pushes the debate slightly in favour of greater NGO access to negotiations. Of itself, the Internet does not overcome the proper concerns of opponents based on questions of representativeness and accountability of NGOs. However, the article argues that these problems are counterbalanced to some degree by the expanded ability of electronically networked NGOs to assist in the sensitive process of conferring (or opposing) public approval and hence legitimacy for new agreements. The article concludes with some modest suggestions for greater transparency in negotiations as a response to these research findings.