How Did That Get In My Phone? Unwanted App Distribution on Android Devices

Platon Kotzias, Juan Caballero, Leyla Bilge
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引用次数: 27

Abstract

Android is the most popular operating system with billions of active devices. Unfortunately, its popularity and openness makes it attractive for unwanted apps, i.e., malware and potentially unwanted programs (PUP). In Android, app installations typically happen via the official and alternative markets, but also via other smaller and less understood alternative distribution vectors such as Web downloads, pay-per-install (PPI) services, backup restoration, bloatware, and IM tools. This work performs a thorough investigation on unwanted app distribution by quantifying and comparing distribution through different vectors. At the core of our measurements are reputation logs of a large security vendor, which include 7.9M apps observed in 12M devices between June and September 2019. As a first step, we measure that between 10% and 24% of users devices encounter at least one unwanted app, and compare the prevalence of malware and PUP. An analysis of the who-installs-who relationships between installers and child apps reveals that the Play market is the main app distribution vector, responsible for 87% of all installs and 67% of unwanted app installs, but it also has the best defenses against unwanted apps. Alternative markets distribute instead 5.7% of all apps, but over 10% of unwanted apps. Bloatware is also a significant unwanted app distribution vector with 6% of those installs. And, backup restoration is an unintentional distribution vector that may even allow unwanted apps to survive users’ phone replacement. We estimate unwanted app distribution via PPI to be smaller than on Windows. Finally, we observe that Web downloads are rare, but provide a riskier proposition even compared to alternative markets.
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那是怎么到我手机里的?Android设备上不受欢迎的应用分发
安卓是最受欢迎的操作系统,拥有数十亿台活跃设备。不幸的是,它的受欢迎程度和开放性使它对不需要的应用程序(即恶意软件和潜在不需要的程序)具有吸引力。在Android中,应用安装通常是通过官方和替代市场进行的,但也会通过其他较小且不太为人所知的替代发行媒介进行,如Web下载、按安装付费(PPI)服务、备份恢复、臃肿软件和IM工具。这项工作通过量化和比较不同媒介的传播,对不受欢迎的应用传播进行了彻底的调查。我们测量的核心是一家大型安全供应商的声誉日志,其中包括2019年6月至9月期间在1200万台设备上观察到的790万个应用程序。作为第一步,我们测量了10%到24%的用户设备遇到至少一个不需要的应用程序,并比较了恶意软件和PUP的流行程度。对安装者和儿童应用之间谁安装谁关系的分析显示,Play市场是主要的应用传播媒介,占所有应用安装量的87%,占不必要应用安装量的67%,但它也是防止不必要应用的最佳渠道。替代市场投放了5.7%的应用,但超过10%的不受欢迎的应用。臃肿软件也是一个重要的不必要的应用传播媒介,占安装量的6%。而且,备份恢复是一个无意的传播媒介,甚至可能允许不需要的应用程序在用户更换手机后存活下来。我们估计通过PPI进行的不必要的应用分发比Windows要少。最后,我们观察到网络下载是罕见的,但提供了一个更有风险的命题,甚至与其他市场相比。
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