Innovate Versus Imitate: Theory and Experimental Evidence

J. Duffy, Jason Ralston
{"title":"Innovate Versus Imitate: Theory and Experimental Evidence","authors":"J. Duffy, Jason Ralston","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3359870","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We model and experimentally evaluate the trade-off between innovation and imitation commonly faced by firms. Innovation involves searching for a high payoff opportunity, but paying a cost in order to do so. Imitation involves avoiding that search cost and copying the most successful payoff opportunity uncovered thus far. We formulate a novel model of sequential innovation versus imitation decisions made by a group of n regret minimizing agents. We analyze the consequences of complete versus incomplete information about the distribution of payoffs from innovation on agents’ decisions. We then study these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we find evidence in support of our theoretical predictions.","PeriodicalId":11062,"journal":{"name":"Development of Innovation eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Development of Innovation eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3359870","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

Abstract

Abstract We model and experimentally evaluate the trade-off between innovation and imitation commonly faced by firms. Innovation involves searching for a high payoff opportunity, but paying a cost in order to do so. Imitation involves avoiding that search cost and copying the most successful payoff opportunity uncovered thus far. We formulate a novel model of sequential innovation versus imitation decisions made by a group of n regret minimizing agents. We analyze the consequences of complete versus incomplete information about the distribution of payoffs from innovation on agents’ decisions. We then study these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we find evidence in support of our theoretical predictions.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
创新与模仿:理论与实验证据
摘要本文建立模型并通过实验对企业通常面临的创新与模仿之间的权衡进行了评估。创新包括寻找高回报的机会,但要为此付出代价。模仿包括避免搜索成本,复制迄今为止发现的最成功的收益机会。我们建立了一个由n个后悔最小化代理组成的连续创新与模仿决策的新模型。我们分析了关于创新收益分配的完全信息和不完全信息对代理人决策的影响。然后,我们在实验室实验中研究这些预测,在那里我们找到支持我们理论预测的证据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Dynamic Development Contests Financial Innovation in the 21st Century: Evidence from U.S. Patents Local Technology Adoption and Innovation: The Establishment of U.S. Airmail and the Organization of Aviation Innovation Paying off the Competition: Market Power and Innovation Incentives Conceptualizing Strategic Innovation in a Firm Context: A Theoretical Review and Research Agenda
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1