Sustainable automotive supply chain in the presence of disruption and government intervention

Abstract

This paper aims to develop and simulate a green automotive supply chain model (ASC) consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and two types of products (green and non-green) under disruption risks (DRs). The greening effort (i.e., electric vehicle production) is considered for both the supplier and the manufacturer. In our modeling, we include the local government intervention (GI) and their incentivization of manufacturers to produce greener products. Moreover, the effectiveness of centralized versus decentralized supply chain integration strategies in coping with disruption consequences was explored. A mathematical pricing model based on game theory is designed to maximize the total profit for both integrated and decentralized systems. The model examines the effects of the greening effort on the supply chain (SC) members with eight disruption scenarios, including Extra Production and Surplus Inventory. Simulating numerical examples reveals that the Extra Production type of disruption increase the profitability in different scenarios. Conversely, the Surplus Inventory disruption reduces profitability. Moreover, a channel coordination through cost sharing contract in the presence of disruption sharing was developed. GI and the cost-sharing contract increase the SC profit. The managerial implications of our findings are also discussed in this paper.