Save Money to Lose Money? Implications of Opting Out of a Voluntary Audit Review for a Firm’s Cost of Debt*

IF 2.5 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE European Accounting Review Pub Date : 2022-08-23 DOI:10.1080/09638180.2022.2087706
Vlad‐Andrei Porumb, Yasemin Zengin‐Karaibrahimoglu, Shuo Wang, Gerald J. Lobo
{"title":"Save Money to Lose Money? Implications of Opting Out of a Voluntary Audit Review for a Firm’s Cost of Debt*","authors":"Vlad‐Andrei Porumb, Yasemin Zengin‐Karaibrahimoglu, Shuo Wang, Gerald J. Lobo","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2087706","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT An audit review (AR) is a mechanism used by boards to assess the quality of interim financial reports on a timely basis. In Canada, the AR is voluntary, with listed firms mandated to disclose when they choose to not purchase additional audit verification. Given the relatively low cost of an AR, opting out of it can be regarded as a negative signal, especially in the context of lenders’ sensitivity to downside risk. Using a sample of 7,585 firm-year observations from 1,616 public firms in Canada over the period 2004-2015, we document that firms without a voluntary AR have a higher cost of debt than firms with an AR. Furthermore, after firms opt out of the AR, the increase in the cost of debt is accompanied by a rise in discretionary abnormal accruals and managers’ stock-based compensation. Moreover, no-AR firms are more likely to reduce post-switch private borrowing and have lower equity analyst following. Our study is the first to document that although listed borrowers that opt out of an AR have a higher cost of debt financing, they are concurrently able to engage in more earnings management and grant their managers higher stock-based compensation because of lower external monitoring.","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":"199 1","pages":"1207 - 1232"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Accounting Review","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2087706","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

ABSTRACT An audit review (AR) is a mechanism used by boards to assess the quality of interim financial reports on a timely basis. In Canada, the AR is voluntary, with listed firms mandated to disclose when they choose to not purchase additional audit verification. Given the relatively low cost of an AR, opting out of it can be regarded as a negative signal, especially in the context of lenders’ sensitivity to downside risk. Using a sample of 7,585 firm-year observations from 1,616 public firms in Canada over the period 2004-2015, we document that firms without a voluntary AR have a higher cost of debt than firms with an AR. Furthermore, after firms opt out of the AR, the increase in the cost of debt is accompanied by a rise in discretionary abnormal accruals and managers’ stock-based compensation. Moreover, no-AR firms are more likely to reduce post-switch private borrowing and have lower equity analyst following. Our study is the first to document that although listed borrowers that opt out of an AR have a higher cost of debt financing, they are concurrently able to engage in more earnings management and grant their managers higher stock-based compensation because of lower external monitoring.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
省钱还是赔钱?选择退出自愿审计审查对公司债务成本的影响*
审计复核(AR)是董事会用来及时评估中期财务报告质量的一种机制。在加拿大,审计责任是自愿的,上市公司被要求在选择不购买额外审计验证时进行披露。鉴于AR的成本相对较低,选择退出可被视为一个负面信号,尤其是在贷款机构对下行风险敏感的背景下。利用2004-2015年期间加拿大1616家上市公司的7585个公司年度观察样本,我们证明,没有自愿应收账款的公司比有自愿应收账款的公司有更高的债务成本。此外,在公司选择退出应收账款后,债务成本的增加伴随着可自由支配的异常应计项目和经理股票薪酬的增加。此外,没有ar的公司更有可能减少转换后的私人借贷,股票分析师的追随率也更低。我们的研究首次证明,尽管选择退出应收帐款的上市借款人的债务融资成本较高,但由于外部监督较低,他们同时能够参与更多的盈余管理,并向其经理授予更高的股票报酬。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
European Accounting Review
European Accounting Review BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
6.10%
发文量
58
期刊介绍: Devoted to the advancement of accounting knowledge, it provides a forum for the publication of high quality accounting research manuscripts. The journal acknowledges its European origins and the distinctive variety of the European accounting research community. Conscious of these origins, European Accounting Review emphasises openness and flexibility, not only regarding the substantive issues of accounting research, but also with respect to paradigms, methodologies and styles of conducting that research. Though European Accounting Review is a truly international journal, it also holds a unique position as it is the only accounting journal to provide a European forum for the reporting of accounting research.
期刊最新文献
Tax Employee Careers and Corporate Tax Outcomes* Relational Work and Accounting: What Venture Capital Analysts Do with Accounting and Other Information in Situations of Uncertainty Regional Social Capital and Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure Moving beyond Beyond Budgeting: A Case Study of the Dynamic Interrelationships between Budgets and Forecasts Climate Disasters and Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts: Evidence from the United States
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1