Algorithmic Fairness from a Non-ideal Perspective

Abstract

Inspired by recent breakthroughs in predictive modeling, practitioners in both industry and government have turned to machine learning with hopes of operationalizing predictions to drive automated decisions. Unfortunately, many social desiderata concerning consequential decisions, such as justice or fairness, have no natural formulation within a purely predictive framework. In the hopes of mitigating these problems, researchers have proposed a variety of metrics for quantifying deviations from various statistical parities that we might hope to observe in a fair world, offering a variety of algorithms that attempt to satisfy subsets of these parities or to trade off the degree to which they are satisfied against utility. In this paper, we connect this approach to fair machine learning to the literature on ideal and non-ideal methodological approaches in political philosophy. The ideal approach requires positing the principles according to which a just world would operate. In the most straightforward application of ideal theory, one supports a proposed policy by arguing that it closes a discrepancy between the real and ideal worlds. However, by failing to account for the mechanisms by which our non-ideal world arose, the responsibilities of various decision-makers, and the impacts of their actions, naive applications of ideal thinking can lead to misguided policies. In this paper, we demonstrate a connection between the recent literature on fair machine learning and the ideal approach in political philosophy, and show that some recently uncovered shortcomings in proposed algorithms reflect broader troubles faced by the ideal approach. We work this analysis through for different formulations of fairness and conclude with a critical discussion of real-world impacts and directions for new research.