Mutual Fund Advisory Misconduct: Investor Flows and Company Reactions

Bing Liang, Yuying Sun, Kai Wu
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

We evaluate the economic consequences of mutual fund advisory misconduct from 2000 to 2015. An average of 31.25% reduction in monthly fund flows occurs in one year after the misconduct. The effect is more pronounced in funds facing strong investor monitoring. Although all types of misconduct have negative effects on sentiment-driven flows, only disclosure-related misconduct has negative effects on fundamental-driven flows. To respond, mutual funds raise marketing expenditures, reduce contractual incentives, impose stricter investment restrictions, hold more liquid assets, and replace malfeasant advisory firms subsequently. These measures alleviate the adverse effects of misconduct on investor flows. Overall, our study highlights the significant impact of misconduct on mutual fund flows and responsive policies in the mutual fund industry.
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共同基金咨询不当行为:投资者流动与公司反应
我们评估了2000年至2015年共同基金咨询不当行为的经济后果。在不当行为发生后的一年内,每月资金流量平均减少31.25%。这种影响在面临强大投资者监督的基金中更为明显。尽管所有类型的不当行为都会对情绪驱动的流动产生负面影响,但只有与披露相关的不当行为才会对基本面驱动的流动产生负面影响。为此,共同基金增加营销支出,减少合同激励,实施更严格的投资限制,持有更多的流动资产,并随后取代违规的咨询公司。这些措施减轻了不当行为对投资者流动的不利影响。总体而言,我们的研究强调了不当行为对共同基金行业的共同资金流动和应对政策的重大影响。
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