Auditor choice in real estate firms: a quality signal?

Abstract

PurposeReal estate is a capital-intensive industry for which the asset values tend to be highly volatile and uncertain. Transaction costs in the industry are therefore high, and transparency for investors may be low. The need to signal reliable estimates of property assets, in the communication to external stakeholders, can therefore be expected to be of extra importance in this sector. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how real estate firms use big four auditors to signal quality.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use Swedish firm level data containing all limited liability real estate companies in the country to determine the determinants of big four auditors. The data set consists of 34,306 observations and is analyzed through logit regressions.FindingsThe results show that big four companies are primarily contracted by large and mature companies, rather than new firms or firms with volatile financial records, although the latter could be expected to have a large need to signal quality. The authors also find that firms listed on the stock market and firms targeting public use real estate are more inclined to use big four companies.Originality/valueReal estate is a capital-intensive industry for which the asset values tend to be highly volatile and uncertain. Transaction costs in the industry are therefore high, and transparency for investors may be low. The need to signal reliable estimates of property assets, in the communication to external stakeholders, can therefore be expected to be of extra importance in this sector. No prior study of this area has been detected.