Survivalism: Systematic Analysis of Windows Malware Living-Off-The-Land

Frederick Barr-Smith, Xabier Ugarte-Pedrero, Mariano Graziano, Riccardo Spolaor, I. Martinovic
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引用次数: 23

Abstract

As malware detection algorithms and methods become more sophisticated, malware authors adopt equally sophisticated evasion mechanisms to defeat them. Anecdotal evidence claims Living-Off-The-Land (LotL) techniques are one of the major evasion techniques used in many malware attacks. These techniques leverage binaries already present in the system to conduct malicious actions. We present the first large-scale systematic investigation of the use of these techniques by malware on Windows systems.In this paper, we analyse how common the use of these native system binaries is across several malware datasets, containing a total of 31,805,549 samples. We identify an average 9.41% prevalence. Our results show that the use of LotL techniques is prolific, particularly in Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) malware samples where the prevalence is 26.26%, over twice that of commodity malware.To illustrate the evasive potential of LotL techniques, we test the usage of LotL techniques against several fully patched Windows systems in a local sandboxed environment and show that there is a generalised detection gap in 10 of the most popular anti-virus products.
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生存主义:Windows恶意软件的系统分析
随着恶意软件检测算法和方法变得越来越复杂,恶意软件作者采用同样复杂的规避机制来击败它们。坊间证据表明,“离地生存”(LotL)技术是许多恶意软件攻击中使用的主要规避技术之一。这些技术利用系统中已经存在的二进制文件来执行恶意操作。我们提出了在Windows系统上使用这些技术的恶意软件的第一次大规模系统调查。在本文中,我们分析了这些本地系统二进制文件在几个恶意软件数据集中的使用情况,总共包含31,805,549个样本。我们确定平均9.41%的患病率。我们的研究结果表明,LotL技术的使用非常多,特别是在高级持续威胁(APT)恶意软件样本中,其患病率为26.26%,是普通恶意软件的两倍多。为了说明LotL技术的规避潜力,我们在本地沙箱环境中测试了LotL技术对几个完全打过补丁的Windows系统的使用情况,并显示在10种最流行的反病毒产品中存在普遍的检测差距。
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