Wei Liu, Fangni Zhang, Xiaolei Wang, Chaoyi Shao, Hai Yang
{"title":"Unlock the Sharing Economy: The Case of the Parking Sector for Recurrent Commuting Trips","authors":"Wei Liu, Fangni Zhang, Xiaolei Wang, Chaoyi Shao, Hai Yang","doi":"10.1287/trsc.2021.1103","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the pricing strategy of a parking sharing platform that rents the daytime-usage rights of private parking spaces from parking owners and sells them to parking users. In an urban area with both shared parking and curbside parking, a choice equilibrium model is proposed to predict the number of shared parking users under any given pricing strategy of the platform. We analytically analyze how the pricing strategy of the platform (price charged on users and rent paid to parking owners or sharers) would affect the parking choice equilibrium and several system efficiency metrics. It is shown that the platform is profitable when some parking owners have a relatively small inconvenience cost from sharing their spaces, but its profit is always negative at minimum social cost. Numerical studies are conducted to illustrate the analytical results and provide further understanding.","PeriodicalId":23247,"journal":{"name":"Transp. Sci.","volume":"73 1","pages":"338-357"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Transp. Sci.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.2021.1103","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Abstract
This study examines the pricing strategy of a parking sharing platform that rents the daytime-usage rights of private parking spaces from parking owners and sells them to parking users. In an urban area with both shared parking and curbside parking, a choice equilibrium model is proposed to predict the number of shared parking users under any given pricing strategy of the platform. We analytically analyze how the pricing strategy of the platform (price charged on users and rent paid to parking owners or sharers) would affect the parking choice equilibrium and several system efficiency metrics. It is shown that the platform is profitable when some parking owners have a relatively small inconvenience cost from sharing their spaces, but its profit is always negative at minimum social cost. Numerical studies are conducted to illustrate the analytical results and provide further understanding.