Unicorn Stock Options - Golden Goose or Trojan Horse?

Anat Alon-Beck
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Large privately held startups valued at $1 billion or more (“unicorns”) are grappling with how to deal with employees’ expectations caused by the illiquidity of the shares of stock acquired upon exercise of their options. Until about eight years ago, many talented workers chose to work for a startup company for a lower cash salary combined with a substantial stock option grant and the dream of cashing out for a large sum of money after an initial public offering (“IPO”) of the startup’s stock. Today, unicorns remain private for extended periods of time, in part, because they are often no longer dependent on an IPO or a trade sale to raise sufficient capital. As a result, they are delaying liquidity events for their founders, employees, and investors, thereby causing their employee stock options to lose some of their allure as a hiring and retention device. This Article examines a contemporary puzzle in Silicon Valley: Is there a shift in unicorn employees’ expectations that results in labor contract renegotiations? To answer this question, this Article explores the challenges faced by unicorn firms as repeat players in competitive technology markets and offers the following possible solutions. First, it proposes new equity-based compensation contracts, and critiques them. Second, it suggests alternatives to the traditional liquidity mechanisms, and critiques them. Unfortunately, current securities and tax laws create legal barriers to private ordering, which prevent the parties from solving these issues on their own. This Article concludes with proposals to remove these legal barriers to private ordering to allow for the proposed solutions to take hold, accompanied with new mandatory disclosure requirements to limit the risks.
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独角兽股票期权——金鹅还是特洛伊木马?
估值在10亿美元或以上的大型私营初创公司(“独角兽”)正在努力应对员工的期望,这些期望是通过行使期权获得的股票缺乏流动性造成的。直到大约8年前,许多有才华的员工选择为初创公司工作,因为他们的现金工资较低,还能获得大量的股票期权,并梦想着在初创公司的股票首次公开发行(IPO)后兑现一大笔钱。如今,独角兽公司在很长一段时间内保持私有化,部分原因是它们往往不再依赖IPO或交易出售来筹集足够的资金。因此,他们推迟了创始人、员工和投资者的流动性事件,从而导致他们的员工股票期权作为招聘和留住员工的手段失去了一些吸引力。本文探讨了硅谷当代的一个谜题:独角兽员工的期望是否发生了转变,从而导致了劳动合同的重新谈判?为了回答这个问题,本文探讨了独角兽公司在竞争激烈的技术市场中作为重复参与者所面临的挑战,并提供了以下可能的解决方案。首先,它提出了新的基于股权的薪酬合同,并对其进行了批评。其次,本文提出了传统流动性机制的替代方案,并对其进行了批判。不幸的是,现行的证券法和税法为私人订购设置了法律障碍,使各方无法自行解决这些问题。本文最后提出了一些建议,以消除私人订购的这些法律障碍,使所提议的解决方案得以实施,并附有新的强制性披露要求,以限制风险。
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