Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and Historical Account

IF 1.5 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW Indiana Law Journal Pub Date : 2012-07-27 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.1997807
F. M. Gedicks
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment is logically and textually impossible — so say most academics, a few lower-court judges, and a Supreme Court Justice. They maintain that because the Clause was originally understood as a structural limitation on the federal government that protected state power, it cannot restrain state power or fit within the Fourteenth Amendment texts that protect personal rights — indeed, that attempts to show that it does are laughableThis purported incoherence and textual inconsistency enable anti-incorporation critics to avoid serious engagement of Reconstruction history. They also undermine the Clause’s vigorous application against the states and place the Court’s anti-establishment decisions under a cloud of illegitimacy.This Essay sets forth logical, textual, and historical justifications for Establishment Clause incorporation based on the original eighteenth-century understanding of the Clause as a purely structural limitation on federal power. The Establishment Clause did not reserve state power, but disabled congressional action. As an express disability on Congress, the Clause generated two immunities, one held by the states against congressional interference with state decisions about religious establishment or disestablishment, and one held by the people against congressional establishment of a national religion.As part of Reconstruction’s imposition of new federal limits on state power, the Fourteenth Amendment extinguished the state immunity from federal interference, but extended the personal immunity to protect the people against state as well as federally established religions. This is logically coherent in the context of Reconstruction’s goals and also sounds in the personal liberty and citizen immunities protected by the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. When framed by a logical and textual account of Establishment Clause incorporation, Reconstruction history suggests an originalist account that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Establishment Clause to the states.Incorporation of the Establishment Clause, therefore, is eminently defensible. Its justifications require more careful consideration by courts and commentators than they have yet received.
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反对各州的政教分离条款的纳入:逻辑、文本和历史的解释
大多数学者、一些下级法院法官和一位最高法院法官都认为,通过第十四修正案将政教隔离条款纳入反对各州的条款在逻辑上和文本上都是不可能的。他们坚持认为,由于该条款最初被理解为对联邦政府保护州权力的结构性限制,它不能限制州权力,也不能适用于保护个人权利的第十四修正案文本——事实上,试图表明它确实是可笑的。这种所谓的不连贯和文本的不一致使反对合并的批评者能够避免认真参与重建历史。它们还削弱了该条款对各州的有力适用,并使最高法院的反建制裁决蒙上了非法的阴影。本文基于18世纪对该条款纯粹是对联邦权力的结构性限制的最初理解,阐述了纳入该条款的逻辑、文本和历史理由。政教分离条款并没有保留国家权力,而是阻碍了国会的行动。作为对国会的一种明确的残疾,该条款产生了两种豁免,一种是由各州持有的,反对国会干涉国家关于宗教建立或解散的决定,另一种是由人民持有的,反对国会建立国家宗教。作为重建时期联邦对州权力施加新限制的一部分,第十四修正案取消了州不受联邦干预的豁免权,但扩大了个人豁免权,以保护人民不受州和联邦建立的宗教的侵害。这在重建目标的背景下是合乎逻辑的,也符合第十四条修正案文本所保护的个人自由和公民豁免。在对政教分离条款纳入的逻辑和文本解释的框架下,重建历史提出了一种原旨主义的解释,即第十四条修正案将政教分离条款适用于各州。因此,纳入政教分离条款是非常站得住脚的。法院和评论家需要比他们目前收到的更仔细地考虑其理由。
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来源期刊
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1.40
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期刊介绍: Founded in 1925, the Indiana Law Journal is a general-interest academic legal journal. The Indiana Law Journal is published quarterly by students of the Indiana University Maurer School of Law — Bloomington. The opportunity to become a member of the Journal is available to all students at the end of their first-year. Members are selected in one of two ways. First, students in the top of their class academically are automatically invited to become members. Second, a blind-graded writing competition is held to fill the remaining slots. This competition tests students" Bluebook skills and legal writing ability. Overall, approximately thirty-five offers are extended each year. Candidates who accept their offers make a two-year commitment to the Journal.
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