Yasunori Isozaki, S. Yoshizawa, Y. Fujimoto, H. Ishii, Isao Ono, T. Onoda, Y. Hayashi
{"title":"On detection of cyber attacks against voltage control in distribution power grids","authors":"Yasunori Isozaki, S. Yoshizawa, Y. Fujimoto, H. Ishii, Isao Ono, T. Onoda, Y. Hayashi","doi":"10.1109/SmartGridComm.2014.7007753","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we consider the impact of cyber attacks on voltage regulation in distribution systems. We employ a centralized control scheme which utilizes voltage measurements from sectionizing switches equipped with sensors for connecting distributed generation. Through detailed case studies by simulations, it is demonstrated that if measurements are falsified by an attacker, voltage violation can occur in the system. However, by equipping the control with a detection algorithm, we verify that the damage can be limited especially when the number of attacked sensors is small. Further discussion is provided on how to enhance the security level of the proposed algorithm.","PeriodicalId":6499,"journal":{"name":"2014 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)","volume":"96 1","pages":"842-847"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"18","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2014 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm.2014.7007753","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
Abstract
In this paper, we consider the impact of cyber attacks on voltage regulation in distribution systems. We employ a centralized control scheme which utilizes voltage measurements from sectionizing switches equipped with sensors for connecting distributed generation. Through detailed case studies by simulations, it is demonstrated that if measurements are falsified by an attacker, voltage violation can occur in the system. However, by equipping the control with a detection algorithm, we verify that the damage can be limited especially when the number of attacked sensors is small. Further discussion is provided on how to enhance the security level of the proposed algorithm.