Business Group Dominance and Capital Allocation Externalities: Evidence from Korean Chaebols

Jeayoon Kim
{"title":"Business Group Dominance and Capital Allocation Externalities: Evidence from Korean Chaebols","authors":"Jeayoon Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3536784","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates how dominant business groups affect investment decisions of other standalone firms in the economy. Using intra-group equity transactions within the top 40 largest business groups in Korea, this study finds that high levels of internal capital allocation within the groups exert a negative influence on investments of standalone firms that require external capital. Due to financial market imperfections associated with low investor protections, business groups prefer internal investment rather than outside investment. However, when internal capital allocation is prevalent in the economy, lots of capital is trapped inside business groups and available capital in external markets becomes scarce. Standalone firms outside business groups have difficulties raising external finance and thus reduce investment. The negative influence on investments of business group dominance is particularly pronounced for private standalone firms and the firms that hold fewer tangible assets. Findings in this study suggest a negative externality that business groups impose on other standalone firms: the bias toward internal investment makes it harder for good projects outside business groups to obtain capital.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"公司治理评论","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3536784","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

This study investigates how dominant business groups affect investment decisions of other standalone firms in the economy. Using intra-group equity transactions within the top 40 largest business groups in Korea, this study finds that high levels of internal capital allocation within the groups exert a negative influence on investments of standalone firms that require external capital. Due to financial market imperfections associated with low investor protections, business groups prefer internal investment rather than outside investment. However, when internal capital allocation is prevalent in the economy, lots of capital is trapped inside business groups and available capital in external markets becomes scarce. Standalone firms outside business groups have difficulties raising external finance and thus reduce investment. The negative influence on investments of business group dominance is particularly pronounced for private standalone firms and the firms that hold fewer tangible assets. Findings in this study suggest a negative externality that business groups impose on other standalone firms: the bias toward internal investment makes it harder for good projects outside business groups to obtain capital.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
企业集团支配与资本配置外部性:来自韩国财阀的证据
本研究探讨了经济中占主导地位的企业集团如何影响其他独立企业的投资决策。利用韩国前40大企业集团的集团内部股权交易,本研究发现,集团内部高水平的内部资本配置对需要外部资本的独立公司的投资产生负面影响。由于金融市场的不完善和投资者保护程度较低,企业集团更喜欢内部投资而不是外部投资。然而,当经济内部资本配置盛行时,大量资本被困在企业集团内部,外部市场上可用的资本变得稀缺。商业集团之外的独立公司难以筹集外部资金,从而减少投资。商业集团主导地位对投资的负面影响对私人独立公司和持有较少有形资产的公司尤为明显。本研究的发现表明,商业集团对其他独立公司施加了负外部性:对内部投资的偏好使得商业集团外部的好项目更难获得资本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
135
期刊最新文献
ProMarket 11 Recommends Financial Advisor with AI, Yet It Gets No Interest from Italian Financial Services. Why R. Abravanel Is Wrong and Why No Italian Google Exists Corporate Real Estate Usage and Firm Valuation: Evidence from a Dynamic Partial Adjustment Model Rights of Secured Creditors under Indian Insolvency Law Do Lenders Still Monitor? Leveraged Lending and the Search for Covenants Once Bitten, Twice Shy: Learning From Corporate Fraud and Corporate Governance Spillovers
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1