{"title":"Fænomenologi og antropocentrisme","authors":"N. Knudsen","doi":"10.7146/rt.v0i71.128087","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"SUMMARY: This article poses the question: Is phenomenology anthropocentric? In the first half, I show that both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophy take their point departure in the relation between the human being and the world, but that they both also argue that their respective analysis transcends the horizon of anthropology by inquiring into meaning or being as such. I then distinguish between ontological, epistemological, and ethical anthropocentrism and argue that these forms of anthropocentrism do not necessarily imply each other. In the next half, I focus on Heidegger’s analysis of the animal. I argue that Heidegger’s philosophy is ontologically anthropocentric but neither epistemologically nor ethically anthropocentric. In opposition to posthumanism, my thesis is that the particular kind of ontological anthropocentrism that characterise Heidegger and phenomenology is a presupposition rather than an obstacle for the capacity for understanding and caring for other creatures. I call this position anthropoeccentrism. \nRESUME: Denne artikel stiller spørgsmålet: Er fænomenologien antropocentrisk? I den første halvdel viser jeg, at både Husserls og Heideggers filosofi ganske vist tager udgangspunkt i menneskets forhold til verden, men at de begge mener, at deres respektive analyser overskrider antropologiens spørgehorisont ved at spørge om mening eller væren som sådan. Dernæst skelner jeg mellem ontologisk, epistemologisk, og etisk antropocentrisme og argumenterer for, at disse former for antropocentrisme ikke nødvendigvis følger af hinanden. I den næste halvdel fokuserer jeg på Heideggers analyse af dyret. Jeg argumenterer for, at Heideggers filosofi er ontologisk antropocentrisk, men hverken epistemologisk eller etisk antropocentrisk. I modsætning til posthumanismen er min tese, at den særlige form for ontologisk antropocentrisme, der kendetegner Heidegger og fænomenologien, er en forudsætning snarere end en forhindring for evnen til at kunne forstå og drage omsorg for andre væsner. Denne position kalder jeg for antropoexcentrisme.","PeriodicalId":38779,"journal":{"name":"Religionsvidenskabeligt Tidsskrift","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Religionsvidenskabeligt Tidsskrift","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7146/rt.v0i71.128087","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
SUMMARY: This article poses the question: Is phenomenology anthropocentric? In the first half, I show that both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophy take their point departure in the relation between the human being and the world, but that they both also argue that their respective analysis transcends the horizon of anthropology by inquiring into meaning or being as such. I then distinguish between ontological, epistemological, and ethical anthropocentrism and argue that these forms of anthropocentrism do not necessarily imply each other. In the next half, I focus on Heidegger’s analysis of the animal. I argue that Heidegger’s philosophy is ontologically anthropocentric but neither epistemologically nor ethically anthropocentric. In opposition to posthumanism, my thesis is that the particular kind of ontological anthropocentrism that characterise Heidegger and phenomenology is a presupposition rather than an obstacle for the capacity for understanding and caring for other creatures. I call this position anthropoeccentrism.
RESUME: Denne artikel stiller spørgsmålet: Er fænomenologien antropocentrisk? I den første halvdel viser jeg, at både Husserls og Heideggers filosofi ganske vist tager udgangspunkt i menneskets forhold til verden, men at de begge mener, at deres respektive analyser overskrider antropologiens spørgehorisont ved at spørge om mening eller væren som sådan. Dernæst skelner jeg mellem ontologisk, epistemologisk, og etisk antropocentrisme og argumenterer for, at disse former for antropocentrisme ikke nødvendigvis følger af hinanden. I den næste halvdel fokuserer jeg på Heideggers analyse af dyret. Jeg argumenterer for, at Heideggers filosofi er ontologisk antropocentrisk, men hverken epistemologisk eller etisk antropocentrisk. I modsætning til posthumanismen er min tese, at den særlige form for ontologisk antropocentrisme, der kendetegner Heidegger og fænomenologien, er en forudsætning snarere end en forhindring for evnen til at kunne forstå og drage omsorg for andre væsner. Denne position kalder jeg for antropoexcentrisme.