Quirin Scheitle, Oliver Gasser, Theodor Nolte, J. Amann, Lexi Brent, G. Carle, Ralph Holz, T. Schmidt, Matthias Wählisch
{"title":"The Rise of Certificate Transparency and Its Implications on the Internet Ecosystem","authors":"Quirin Scheitle, Oliver Gasser, Theodor Nolte, J. Amann, Lexi Brent, G. Carle, Ralph Holz, T. Schmidt, Matthias Wählisch","doi":"10.1145/3278532.3278562","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we analyze the evolution of Certificate Transparency (CT) over time and explore the implications of exposing certificate DNS names from the perspective of security and privacy. We find that certificates in CT logs have seen exponential growth. Website support for CT has also constantly increased, with now 33% of established connections supporting CT. With the increasing deployment of CT, there are also concerns of information leakage due to all certificates being visible in CT logs. To understand this threat, we introduce a CT honeypot and show that data from CT logs is being used to identify targets for scanning campaigns only minutes after certificate issuance. We present and evaluate a methodology to learn and validate new subdomains from the vast number of domains extracted from CT logged certificates.","PeriodicalId":20640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","volume":"133 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"54","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3278532.3278562","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 54
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the evolution of Certificate Transparency (CT) over time and explore the implications of exposing certificate DNS names from the perspective of security and privacy. We find that certificates in CT logs have seen exponential growth. Website support for CT has also constantly increased, with now 33% of established connections supporting CT. With the increasing deployment of CT, there are also concerns of information leakage due to all certificates being visible in CT logs. To understand this threat, we introduce a CT honeypot and show that data from CT logs is being used to identify targets for scanning campaigns only minutes after certificate issuance. We present and evaluate a methodology to learn and validate new subdomains from the vast number of domains extracted from CT logged certificates.