{"title":"On Armstrong’s Difficulties with Adequate Truthmaking Restrictions","authors":"Brannon McDaniel","doi":"10.5840/jpr2019108140","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"D. M. Armstrong rejects various ontologies that posit truths without truthmakers. But, lest proponents of such questionable ontologies postulate suspicious truthmakers in a bid to regain ontological respectability, Armstrong requires a plausible restriction on truthmaking that eliminates such ontologies. I discuss three different candidate restrictions: categorical, natural, and intrinsic difference-making. While the categorical and natural restrictions eliminate the questionable ontologies, they also eliminate Armstrong’s own ontology. The intrinsic difference-making restriction, on the other hand, fails to eliminate any of them. Thus Armstrong lacks a principled reason for rejecting such ontologies.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Philosophical Research","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr2019108140","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
D. M. Armstrong rejects various ontologies that posit truths without truthmakers. But, lest proponents of such questionable ontologies postulate suspicious truthmakers in a bid to regain ontological respectability, Armstrong requires a plausible restriction on truthmaking that eliminates such ontologies. I discuss three different candidate restrictions: categorical, natural, and intrinsic difference-making. While the categorical and natural restrictions eliminate the questionable ontologies, they also eliminate Armstrong’s own ontology. The intrinsic difference-making restriction, on the other hand, fails to eliminate any of them. Thus Armstrong lacks a principled reason for rejecting such ontologies.
D. M.阿姆斯特朗拒绝各种没有真理制造者的真理假定本体论。但是,为了避免这些有问题的本体论的支持者为了重新获得本体论的尊重而假设可疑的真理制造者,阿姆斯特朗要求对真理制造进行合理的限制,以消除这些本体论。我讨论了三种不同的候选限制:绝对的、自然的和内在的差异。当范畴限制和自然限制消除了可疑的本体论时,它们也消除了阿姆斯特朗自己的本体论。另一方面,内在的差异性限制却不能消除其中的任何一个。因此,阿姆斯特朗缺乏拒绝这些本体论的原则性理由。
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Philosophical Research is an annual peer-reviewed journal uniquely committed to the advancement of all areas of philosophical inquiry. It publishes articles from any philosophical orientation, in English or French, that make a significant contribution to the field. A generous length limit provides an outlet for essential works such as bibliographies, translations, and commentaries that are difficult to publish because of unusual length or complex format. JPR is particularly interested in helping new authors and an outstanding group of referees provides written comments on submitted manuscripts.