Brand Bidding Restraints Revisited: What Is the Appropriate Economic and Legal Framework for the Antitrust Analysis of Vertical Online Search Advertising Restraints?

IF 0.7 Q2 LAW World Competition Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI:10.54648/woco2021022
Elias Deutscher
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This article explores the law and economics of brand bidding restraints which constitute the most novel type of vertical restraints imposed by brand owners on their distributors in digital markets. The article tests and critically reflects on the restrictive approach European competition watchdogs have recently adopted towards these brand bidding restraints. It contends that this harsh antitrust treatment of brand bidding restraints is not sufficiently grounded in the economic analysis of vertical restraints. In proposing a comprehensive framework for the legal and economic analysis of brand bidding restraints, the article makes three principal contributions. First, it asserts that brand bidding restraints can have a number of procompetitive effects by internalizing advertising-related externalities, addressing free-riding on display and traditional advertising and facilitating fixed cost recovery through price discrimination. Second, the paper considers different ways through which brand bidding restraints may harm competition and consumer welfare when they disproportionately affect infra-marginal consumers, prevent meaningful intra- and inter-brand comparisons or result in price discrimination on the basis of search costs rather than brand preferences. Moreover, brand bidding restraints are of particular concern when adopted in the context of dual distribution systems where vertically integrated brand owners have an incentive to raise their retailers’ costs to prevent them from cannibalizing on their own sales channel. Third, the article explore various filters that may inform an effects-based analysis of brand bidding restraints. In this respect, the article makes a number of policy recommendations for the future antitrust analysis of brand bidding restraints. These proposals could also inform the ongoing revision of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (VBER) and Vertical Guidelines in the EU and in the UK. brand bidding restraints, vertical online search advertising restraints, digital vertical restraints, e-commerce sector inquiry, B2-98/11 Asics, Case COMP/AT.40428 Guess, vertical restraints, Vertical Guidelines, Vertical Block Exemption Regulation
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品牌竞价约束重访:垂直网络搜索广告约束反垄断分析的合适经济和法律框架是什么?
本文探讨了品牌竞标约束的法律和经济学,它构成了品牌所有者在数字市场上对其分销商施加的最新颖的垂直约束。本文测试并批判性地反思了欧洲竞争监管机构最近对这些品牌竞标限制所采取的限制性方法。它认为,这种对品牌竞标限制的严厉反垄断处理没有充分基于对垂直限制的经济分析。在为品牌投标限制的法律和经济分析提出一个全面的框架时,本文做出了三个主要贡献。首先,它断言品牌投标限制可以通过内部化广告相关的外部性,解决免费利用展示和传统广告以及通过价格歧视促进固定成本回收的问题,从而产生一系列促进竞争的影响。其次,本文考虑了不同的方式,通过品牌竞价限制可能损害竞争和消费者福利,当他们不成比例地影响超边际消费者,阻止有意义的品牌内部和品牌之间的比较,或导致基于搜索成本而不是品牌偏好的价格歧视。此外,在采用双重分销系统的情况下,品牌出价限制尤其值得关注,因为垂直整合的品牌所有者有动机提高零售商的成本,以防止他们侵占自己的销售渠道。第三,本文探讨了各种过滤器,可以为基于效果的品牌竞标限制分析提供信息。在这方面,本文对未来反垄断分析品牌竞价约束提出了若干政策建议。这些建议还可以为欧盟和英国正在进行的垂直块豁免条例(VBER)和垂直指南的修订提供信息。品牌竞价约束,垂直在线搜索广告约束,数字垂直约束,电子商务行业查询,02 -98/11 Asics, Case COMP/AT.40428猜,垂直限制,垂直指南,垂直块豁免规则
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CiteScore
0.90
自引率
25.00%
发文量
18
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