What Does the Emerging International Law of Migration Mean for Sovereignty

Chantal Thomas
{"title":"What Does the Emerging International Law of Migration Mean for Sovereignty","authors":"Chantal Thomas","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2231454","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The emergence of an international law of migration has lent ballast to claims by philosophers, such as Benhabib, who contend that “since the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, we have entered a phase in the evolution of global civil society, which is characterized by a transition from international to cosmopolitan norms of justice.” However, migrant rights are often hotly contested, not least by the states against whom they are asserted. At the very least, however, presumptions of absolute sovereign prerogative have been thrown into question. If national borders are far from open to migrants, one might be able to say that as a normative matter, at least, they are less presumptively, or more contestedly, closed.My purpose in this draft essay is not to mount a detailed doctrinal analysis of this emerging international law, but rather to survey the theoretical discourses of sovereignty that create the backdrop for current debates over migration law and policy. I conclude that neither liberal nor biopolitical discourses by themselves explain the warp and weave of this emerging body of law. Rather, a structural equivocation within international law encompasses opposing positions of realpolitik apology for sovereign power, on the one hand, and aspiration towards utopian universality, on the other. Moreover, a survey of the history of international law locates the bases for migrant rights (alongside other human rights claims) in natural law traditions that predate the rise of “plenary power” conceptions of sovereignty. Before we international lawyers congratulate ourselves regarding the progressive or progressionistic roots of international law, however, the colonial dimension of those natural law traditions should be clarified.Finally, I want to explore an ethics for migration law and policy that would extend beyond the constraints that, similarly to those described above for emerging law, also characterize current discourses of reform - made salient by the recent “comprehensive immigration reform” debates in the U.S. Congress - that is to say, beyond an apologetic pragmatics of population management on the one hand versus a utopian cosmopolitanism, on the other. Somewhat tentatively for the time being I am calling this an ethics of “new organicism.”","PeriodicalId":42243,"journal":{"name":"Melbourne Journal of International Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"11","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Melbourne Journal of International Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2231454","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11

Abstract

The emergence of an international law of migration has lent ballast to claims by philosophers, such as Benhabib, who contend that “since the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, we have entered a phase in the evolution of global civil society, which is characterized by a transition from international to cosmopolitan norms of justice.” However, migrant rights are often hotly contested, not least by the states against whom they are asserted. At the very least, however, presumptions of absolute sovereign prerogative have been thrown into question. If national borders are far from open to migrants, one might be able to say that as a normative matter, at least, they are less presumptively, or more contestedly, closed.My purpose in this draft essay is not to mount a detailed doctrinal analysis of this emerging international law, but rather to survey the theoretical discourses of sovereignty that create the backdrop for current debates over migration law and policy. I conclude that neither liberal nor biopolitical discourses by themselves explain the warp and weave of this emerging body of law. Rather, a structural equivocation within international law encompasses opposing positions of realpolitik apology for sovereign power, on the one hand, and aspiration towards utopian universality, on the other. Moreover, a survey of the history of international law locates the bases for migrant rights (alongside other human rights claims) in natural law traditions that predate the rise of “plenary power” conceptions of sovereignty. Before we international lawyers congratulate ourselves regarding the progressive or progressionistic roots of international law, however, the colonial dimension of those natural law traditions should be clarified.Finally, I want to explore an ethics for migration law and policy that would extend beyond the constraints that, similarly to those described above for emerging law, also characterize current discourses of reform - made salient by the recent “comprehensive immigration reform” debates in the U.S. Congress - that is to say, beyond an apologetic pragmatics of population management on the one hand versus a utopian cosmopolitanism, on the other. Somewhat tentatively for the time being I am calling this an ethics of “new organicism.”
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
新兴的国际移民法对主权意味着什么
国际移民法的出现为Benhabib等哲学家的主张提供了支撑,他们认为“自1948年联合国人权宣言以来,我们已经进入了全球公民社会演变的一个阶段,其特征是从国际正义准则向世界正义准则过渡。”然而,移民的权利经常受到激烈的争论,尤其是在那些主张移民权利的国家之间。然而,至少,绝对主权特权的假设受到了质疑。如果国家边界远未对移民开放,人们或许可以说,作为一个规范问题,至少,它们不那么假定或更有争议地关闭了。我在这篇初稿中的目的不是对这一新兴的国际法进行详细的理论分析,而是调查主权的理论话语,这些话语为当前关于移民法律和政策的辩论创造了背景。我的结论是,自由主义和生命政治话语本身都无法解释这一新兴法律体系的扭曲和编织。相反,国际法中的结构性模棱两可包括现实政治的对立立场,一方面是为主权权力道歉,另一方面是对乌托邦普遍性的渴望。此外,对国际法历史的调查发现,移民权利(以及其他人权主张)的基础是在主权的“全部权力”概念兴起之前的自然法传统中。然而,在我们国际律师为国际法的进步或进步主义根源而沾沾自喜之前,应该澄清这些自然法传统的殖民方面。最后,我想探讨一种移民法律和政策的伦理,它将超越约束,与上述新兴法律的约束类似,这些约束也是当前改革话语的特征——最近在美国国会进行的“全面移民改革”辩论突出了这一点——也就是说,一方面超越了人口管理的道歉实用主义,另一方面超越了乌托邦世界主义。暂时,我暂且暂且称其为“新有机体论”的伦理学。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
3
期刊最新文献
Protection of Climate Displaced Persons under International Law: A Case Study from Mataso Island, Vanuatu Indigenous Consent: A Self-Determination Perspective A Requiem for the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Something New, Something Old and Something Borrowed? International cooperation and responsibility sharing to combat climate change: Lessons for international refugee law Affective Critique: Fear, Hope, Abandonment and Pleasure in Dianne Otto's Living with International Law
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1