Investors’ Information Avoidance Behavior in Securities-Based Crowdfunding

Nicole L. Cade, S. Garavaglia, Vicky B. Hoffman
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Abstract

We conduct two experiments in the securities-based crowdfunding setting to investigate whether some investors avoid accounting information for psychological reasons and the consequences for investment decisions. We find in our first experiment that nonprofessional investors sometimes choose not to acquire a potential investment’s financial statements to avoid the psychological discomfort they expect from evaluating financial information. Further, despite this lack of due diligence in the high-risk crowdfunding environment, we find that the investors who avoid (versus acquire) a company’s financial statements are more willing to invest in its offering. Our second experiment demonstrates investors randomly assigned to not having (versus having) the same financial statements continue to be more willing to invest, suggesting even investors who would choose to avoid financial statements would use them if crowdfunding companies were required to display them prominently. Together, the findings indicate investors who anticipate discomfort from evaluating financial information disadvantage themselves by choosing not to acquire information they would integrate into their decisions. Our results provide one behavioral explanation for investors’ documented underuse of accounting information.
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证券众筹中投资者的信息回避行为
我们在基于证券的众筹环境下进行了两个实验,以调查一些投资者是否出于心理原因而回避会计信息,以及对投资决策的后果。我们在第一个实验中发现,非专业投资者有时选择不获取潜在投资的财务报表,以避免他们在评估财务信息时预期的心理不适。此外,尽管在高风险的众筹环境中缺乏尽职调查,但我们发现,回避(而不是获取)公司财务报表的投资者更愿意投资其发行。我们的第二个实验表明,随机分配到没有(或有)相同财务报表的投资者仍然更愿意投资,这表明,如果众筹公司被要求突出展示财务报表,即使是选择避免财务报表的投资者也会使用财务报表。总之,研究结果表明,投资者在评估财务信息劣势时会感到不适,因此他们选择不获取他们将整合到决策中的信息。我们的研究结果为投资者对会计信息的充分利用提供了一种行为解释。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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