Relaciones entre gestión corporativa y crisis financiera en el mercado de capitales español

Abstract

The international financial crisis that began in August 2007 has had devastating effects on international capital markets. The aim of this paper is to study whether the crisis has led to the Spanish financial market firms obtaining abnormally negative returns, and then to investigate what factors related to corporate governance could justify these anomalies. The results demonstrate that: (i) when the same person assumes the position of managing director and chairman of the board this, contrary to expectations, has had beneficial effects on corporate governance, with these anomalies gradually disappearing over time; (ii) high levels of leverage have led to the disappearance of the benefits of debt and are justifying the positive relationship with negative abnormal returns; and (iii) the ability to control boards with numerous members confirms that corporate management has not been effective, since the trajectory of the yields of the companies has deteriorated.