Global responses to maritime violence: collaboration and collective action

Abstract

the role of the opponent. Aside from the strategy of the latter, there is the case of their antistrategy or response to British strategy. Lastly, there are questions of politics. Conflict both results from and entails coalitions of support and position, and moves arise from seeking to sustain these coalitions. As a consequence, there is no optimum strategy in some sort of mechanistic fashion, but, instead, a shifting response to often complex tensions or possible tensions in such coalitions. It cannot be said that work on naval history has always captured the latter. There is, for example, more material on the impact of the Anglo-Prussian alliance on British amphibious operations against the French coast than there is as far as most of the naval operations are concerned; although there is worthwhile work on the Prussian pressure for a British naval commitment to the Baltic. That pressure was unsuccessful, but that did not mean that it was without significance for the politics of British naval moves. Alas, it cannot be said that foreign and British diplomatic sources have been systemically probed for this question. Nor is there an adequate assessment of the changing domestic dimension, although Richard Middleton’s work in the 1980s is still of great value. As a consequence of these limitations, work on the strategy of the conflict can be somewhat simplistic. This is notably so in terms of the relationships with foreign policy, for example the possibility of Hanover dropping out of the war for good in 1757–8. Robson’s forte is a more operational approach to strategy. Within that, he offers an excellent, accessible and highly lucid account of the vital role played by the Royal Navy in British success during the Seven Years War. It situates naval and maritime power firmly at the centre of British strategy. The approach is essentially chronological, and, within that, geographical. This helps provide coherence for the reader and aids analysis. At the same time, this approach risks underplaying the simultaneity of events and pressures. On the whole, Robson handles that well and provides, as a consequence, the best book on the subject. It is particularly valuable to see the scope of his account. For example, he covers the war on the Great Lakes. In doing so, he is able to argue that the loss of Fort William Henry in 1757 was a direct result of its commanders’ lack of naval resources to contest the French projecting power across Lake George. Such observations indicate the range of this most impressive book. It should be in every library covering naval history. Some works in this series by I.B. Tauris and National Museum of the Royal Navy do not work well but that is not the case for this book. More generally, it raises interesting questions about the relationships between capabilities and outcomes and between strategic and operational dimensions.