Systemic Operational Risk – Smoke and Mirrors

IF 0.4 4区 经济学 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Operational Risk Pub Date : 2012-07-07 DOI:10.21314/JOP.2012.109
P. Mcconnell
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

Christmas 2009 did not bring much festive cheer to the shareholders of Australia's largest banks. On December 23rd, the so-called Four Pillars announced simultaneously that their subsidiaries in New Zealand had settled with the NZ Inland Revenue Department (IRD), in respect of long-running litigation that resulted in payments of unpaid tax and interest totaling some NZ$ 2.2 Billion. The settlement followed a finding in October 2009, in the High Court of New Zealand, in favor of the local tax authorities as regards a series of 'Structured Finance Transactions', which the IRD claimed were specifically designed to avoid paying tax in New Zealand. The transactions in dispute, which numbered only around 30 across the four banks, were, at face value, highly complex and intricate but when stripped of the 'smoke and mirrors' were little more than standard commercial loans. The profitability, or otherwise, of these disputed transactions depended very much on how profits, losses and tax were accounted for. Because of various tax treaties between New Zealand and Australia, the Australian parents of NZ banks are able, under certain circumstances, to offset operating losses against profits being repatriated from New Zealand. This, in effect, could turn a loss-making transaction into a powerful device for shielding profits from tax, for both the borrower and the lender. The Inland Revenue argued that the tax benefit was, in fact, the 'tax tail that wagged the commercial dog ' in such transactions. New Zealand courts at various levels agreed with this interpretation and unanimously found that the banks concerned were using these transactions to avoid paying tax.This paper argues that the losses to the Australian banks incurred as a result of the NZ Tax Scandal were, in most part, a result of Systemic Operational Risk, in particular, Legal Risk. Using examples from published court cases, the paper identifies some of the Legal Risks that arose using these transactions. The paper then suggests proactive approaches to Systemic Risk Management that should help detect and minimize the impact of similar scandals in future.
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系统性操作风险——障眼法
2009年圣诞节并没有给澳大利亚各大银行的股东们带来多少欢乐。12月23日,所谓的四大支柱同时宣布,他们在新西兰的子公司已经与新西兰税务局(IRD)就长期诉讼达成和解,该诉讼导致未支付的税款和利息总计约22亿新西兰元。2009年10月,新西兰高等法院就一系列“结构性融资交易”做出了有利于当地税务机关的裁决。税务局声称,这些交易是专门为避免在新西兰纳税而设计的。在这四家银行中,有争议的交易只有大约30笔,从表面上看,这些交易非常复杂和错综复杂,但剥去“烟雾和镜子”后,它们只不过是标准的商业贷款。这些有争议交易的盈利能力或其他方面,在很大程度上取决于利润、亏损和税收的计算方式。由于新西兰和澳大利亚之间的各种税收协定,在某些情况下,新西兰银行的澳大利亚母公司可以用从新西兰汇回的利润来抵消经营损失。实际上,这可能会把一笔亏损的交易变成一种强大的工具,以保护借款人和贷款人的利润不受税收的影响。美国国税局认为,在此类交易中,税收优惠实际上是“摇商业狗的税收尾巴”。新西兰各级法院同意这一解释,一致认定有关银行利用这些交易来避税。本文认为,澳大利亚银行因新西兰税务丑闻而遭受的损失,在很大程度上是系统性操作风险,特别是法律风险的结果。本文以已公布的法庭案例为例,确定了使用这些交易产生的一些法律风险。然后,本文建议采取积极主动的系统性风险管理方法,以帮助发现并尽量减少未来类似丑闻的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Journal of Operational Risk
Journal of Operational Risk BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
40.00%
发文量
6
期刊介绍: In December 2017, the Basel Committee published the final version of its standardized measurement approach (SMA) methodology, which will replace the approaches set out in Basel II (ie, the simpler standardized approaches and advanced measurement approach (AMA) that allowed use of internal models) from January 1, 2022. Independently of the Basel III rules, in order to manage and mitigate risks, they still need to be measurable by anyone. The operational risk industry needs to keep that in mind. While the purpose of the now defunct AMA was to find out the level of regulatory capital to protect a firm against operational risks, we still can – and should – use models to estimate operational risk economic capital. Without these, the task of managing and mitigating capital would be incredibly difficult. These internal models are now unshackled from regulatory requirements and can be optimized for managing the daily risks to which financial institutions are exposed. In addition, operational risk models can and should be used for stress tests and Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). The Journal of Operational Risk also welcomes papers on nonfinancial risks as well as topics including, but not limited to, the following. The modeling and management of operational risk. Recent advances in techniques used to model operational risk, eg, copulas, correlation, aggregate loss distributions, Bayesian methods and extreme value theory. The pricing and hedging of operational risk and/or any risk transfer techniques. Data modeling external loss data, business control factors and scenario analysis. Models used to aggregate different types of data. Causal models that link key risk indicators and macroeconomic factors to operational losses. Regulatory issues, such as Basel II or any other local regulatory issue. Enterprise risk management. Cyber risk. Big data.
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