{"title":"The US Supreme Court and the Future of Reproductive Health.","authors":"S. Rosenbaum","doi":"10.1111/1468-0009.12170","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I n the decades since reproductive health rights emerged as an issue before the US Supreme Court, there never has been a term quite like the current one, which will conclude several months before the 2016 presidential election. The origins of the Court’s involvement with reproductive rights can be traced to Griswold v Connecticut (381 US 479 [1965]), which established a constitutional right to marital privacy in the use of contraceptives. Eight years later, in Roe v Wade (410 US 113 [1973]), in a 7 to 2 ruling, the Court held that women’s access to abortion was a protected constitutional right that could be strictly limited only once the third trimester of pregnancy was reached. Nearly 20 years later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey (505 US 833 [1992]), the Court significantly altered Roe’s broad, trimester-based framework. Although technically upholding Roe, a more conservative majority redefined the constitutional standard, permitting states to enact laws restricting abortion before fetal viability but barring laws that imposed an “undue burden” on access to abortion, including “unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.” The politics of abortion led to a barrage of increasingly intrusive laws. For decades federal law has barred virtually all public funding for abortion. Federal law now bars “partial birth” abortions, a specific type of pregnancy termination procedure, regardless of whether it is carried out before or after viability (Gonzales v Carhart, 550 US 124 [2007]). Since 2010, states have enacted 282 abortion restrictions that run the gamut from the targeted regulation of abortion providers distinct from other routine, outpatient surgical procedures (of which abortion is the most common) to laws requiring waiting periods, restricting medication abortions, and curtailing access to abortion after the first trimester.1 Opponents of abortion actively","PeriodicalId":78777,"journal":{"name":"The Milbank Memorial Fund quarterly","volume":"1 1","pages":"23-6"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Milbank Memorial Fund quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0009.12170","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
I n the decades since reproductive health rights emerged as an issue before the US Supreme Court, there never has been a term quite like the current one, which will conclude several months before the 2016 presidential election. The origins of the Court’s involvement with reproductive rights can be traced to Griswold v Connecticut (381 US 479 [1965]), which established a constitutional right to marital privacy in the use of contraceptives. Eight years later, in Roe v Wade (410 US 113 [1973]), in a 7 to 2 ruling, the Court held that women’s access to abortion was a protected constitutional right that could be strictly limited only once the third trimester of pregnancy was reached. Nearly 20 years later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey (505 US 833 [1992]), the Court significantly altered Roe’s broad, trimester-based framework. Although technically upholding Roe, a more conservative majority redefined the constitutional standard, permitting states to enact laws restricting abortion before fetal viability but barring laws that imposed an “undue burden” on access to abortion, including “unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.” The politics of abortion led to a barrage of increasingly intrusive laws. For decades federal law has barred virtually all public funding for abortion. Federal law now bars “partial birth” abortions, a specific type of pregnancy termination procedure, regardless of whether it is carried out before or after viability (Gonzales v Carhart, 550 US 124 [2007]). Since 2010, states have enacted 282 abortion restrictions that run the gamut from the targeted regulation of abortion providers distinct from other routine, outpatient surgical procedures (of which abortion is the most common) to laws requiring waiting periods, restricting medication abortions, and curtailing access to abortion after the first trimester.1 Opponents of abortion actively
自从生殖健康权利成为摆在美国最高法院面前的一个问题以来的几十年里,从未有过一个任期像现在这样,它将在2016年总统大选前几个月结束。最高法院涉及生殖权利的起源可以追溯到格里斯沃尔德诉康涅狄格州案(381 US 479[1965]),该案件确立了在使用避孕药具方面婚姻隐私的宪法权利。八年后,在罗伊诉韦德案(410 US 113[1973])中,最高法院以7比2的票数裁定,妇女获得堕胎是一项受保护的宪法权利,只有在怀孕到第三个月时才能受到严格限制。近20年后,在宾夕法尼亚州东南部计划生育诉凯西案(505 US 833[1992])中,最高法院显著改变了罗伊案中宽泛的、以妊娠期为基础的框架。虽然在技术上支持罗伊案,但更为保守的多数派重新定义了宪法标准,允许各州制定法律限制在胎儿存活之前堕胎,但禁止对堕胎施加“不当负担”的法律,包括“旨在或实际上对寻求堕胎的妇女构成实质性障碍的不必要的健康法规”。堕胎的政治导致了一系列越来越具有侵入性的法律。几十年来,联邦法律几乎禁止所有公共资金用于堕胎。联邦法律现在禁止“部分分娩”堕胎,这是一种特殊的终止妊娠程序,无论堕胎是在胎儿存活之前还是之后进行(Gonzales v Carhart, 550 US 124[2007])。自2010年以来,各州已经颁布了282项堕胎限制,范围从对堕胎提供者的针对性监管,区别于其他常规的门诊手术(堕胎是最常见的),到要求等待期的法律,限制药物堕胎,以及减少妊娠早期堕胎的机会堕胎的反对者积极