The five senses in the medieval law of evidence

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper traces the evolution of sensory model in medieval law of evidence. As the result of the revival of public authorities and the law in the twelfth century, evidentiary rules became one of the central concerns of the jurists. The first principle thence formulated privileged the sight exclusively as the source for sound testimonial evidence. Auditory testimonies, especially that of mere hearsay, were often inadmissible. Possibly in response to practical necessities, the canonists extended the meaning of the sight to refer to all the corporeal senses. But it was not until the rise of Aristotelianism in the second half of the thirteenth century that jurists such as William Durandus and Bartolus began to recognize the role of all the five senses in the formulation of admissible testimonies. Further, for Baldus, the epistemological model of the five senses provided the basis for the evidentiary value of the notarized document, with a special emphasis on the two “consonant” or “communicable” senses of the sight and the hearing. The evolution reflects not only a deep Aristotelian influence on medieval jurisprudence concerning the evidence, but also the efforts of the jurists to lay down the epistemological foundation for a society ruled ever increasingly by the justice and the written.