The Nanny Corporation

IF 1.9 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW University of Chicago Law Review Pub Date : 2009-02-13 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.1348235
M. Henderson
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

Individuals in common pools-employees in firms, shareholders in firms, individuals in insurance plans, and citizens in a jurisdiction - want the managers of those common pools to act paternalistically toward other individuals, because this lowers the costs of being in the pool. The nanny state, which bans smoking in public places and imposes innumerable sin taxes, and the nanny corporation, which is starting to force employees to be more healthy, are simply responding to this demand. These two can thought of as competing in the "market for paternalism" to deliver paternalism to individuals that demand it. Where nannyism is inevitable, as it is in a world in which others pay, the question then becomes which of the two sources of nanny rules - the state or the firm - is the most efficient supplier of paternalism. This essay describes numerous reasons why corporate nannies are superior to their state analogs in some cases. For instance, corporate policies are subjected to more instantaneous feedback from labor markets, which reduces overreaching but also helps solve information problems in ways likely to reduce the sum of decision and error costs. There is, however, no theory under which the state or firm will always be superior at imposing nanny limitations on behavior. Because of this, we might expect firms to supply nanny rules when it is efficient for them to do so, say because of better monitoring, lower agency costs, or the like, and not to do so when government rules could be supplied at lower cost for a given efficacy level. The problem, however, is that there are government rules, regulations, statutes, constitutional provisions, and case law that may distort the market from efficiency. This essay makes the case for corporate nannyism and shows how government regulation may be biased without justification in favor of the nanny state.
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保姆公司
公共资金池中的个人——公司雇员、公司股东、保险计划中的个人和司法管辖区的公民——希望这些公共资金池的管理者对其他个人表现出家长式的态度,因为这降低了参与公共资金池的成本。禁止在公共场所吸烟并征收无数罪恶税的保姆国家,以及开始强迫员工更健康的保姆公司,都只是对这种需求的回应。这两者可以被认为是在“家长制市场”上竞争,将家长制传递给需要它的个人。在保姆主义不可避免的地方,就像在一个由他人买单的世界里一样,那么问题就变成了保姆规则的两个来源——国家还是公司——哪一个是家长作风最有效的提供者。这篇文章描述了为什么公司保姆在某些情况下优于国家保姆的许多原因。例如,公司政策受到劳动力市场更多即时反馈的影响,这减少了过度扩张,但也有助于以可能减少决策和错误成本总和的方式解决信息问题。然而,没有理论表明,国家或公司在对行为施加保姆限制方面总是更胜一筹。正因为如此,我们可能会期望公司在这样做是有效的时候提供保姆规则,比如因为更好的监督,更低的代理成本,或者类似的,而不是当政府规则可以以更低的成本提供给定的功效水平时这样做。但问题是,有可能扭曲市场效率的政府规章、条例、法令、宪法规定和判例法。这篇文章阐述了企业保姆主义,并展示了政府监管如何在没有正当理由的情况下偏向保姆国家。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
5.00%
发文量
2
期刊介绍: The University of Chicago Law Review is a quarterly journal of legal scholarship. Often cited in Supreme Court and other court opinions, as well as in other scholarly works, it is among the most influential journals in the field. Students have full responsibility for editing and publishing the Law Review; they also contribute original scholarship of their own. The Law Review"s editorial board selects all pieces for publication and, with the assistance of staff members, performs substantive and technical edits on each of these pieces prior to publication.
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