RE: Amendments to Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice

Bernard S. Sharfman
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

The SEC’s recently proposed Amendments to Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice is an efficient and necessary response to the “collective action” problem that is imbedded in the shareholder voting of public companies and the deficiencies that this problem creates in the voting recommendations of proxy advisors. The amendments will enhance the value of voting recommendations by requiring proxy advisors to make much needed investments in a few key areas of the voting recommendation process.

Part I of this letter will describe the collective action problem that is at the heart of shareholder voting. Part II will discuss the problems that this collective action causes for the voting recommendations of proxy advisors, including the creation of a resource constrained business environment. Part III discusses how proxy advisors deal with such a business environment. Part IV will discuss how the market for voting recommendations is an example of a market failure, requiring the SEC to pursue regulatory action to mitigate the harm caused by two significant negative externalities. Part V will discuss how the collective action problem of shareholder voting and the market failure impacts corporate governance. Part VI will discuss the value of the proposed amendments.
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回复:对代理投票建议的代理规则豁免的修订
美国证券交易委员会最近提出的《代理投票建议豁免代理规则修正案》是对上市公司股东投票中隐含的“集体行动”问题以及该问题在代理顾问投票建议中造成的缺陷的有效和必要的回应。这些修正案将通过要求代理顾问在投票建议过程的几个关键领域进行急需的投资来提高投票建议的价值。这封信的第一部分将描述股东投票的核心——集体行动问题。第二部分将讨论这种集体行为对代理顾问投票建议造成的问题,包括造成资源受限的商业环境。第三部分讨论代理顾问如何应对这样的商业环境。第四部分将讨论投票推荐市场如何成为市场失灵的一个例子,要求美国证券交易委员会采取监管行动,以减轻两个重大负面外部性造成的伤害。第五部分将讨论股东投票和市场失灵的集体行动问题对公司治理的影响。第六部分将讨论拟议修正案的价值。
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