{"title":"The Market Impact of Systemic Risk Capital Surcharges","authors":"Yalin Gündüz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3581059","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper tests whether an increase or decrease of the capital surcharge for being a global systemically important bank (G-SIB) envisaged by regulators has an impact on the CDS prices of these banks. We find evidence that the CDS spreads of a G-SIB bank increase (decrease) after the announcement of a higher (lower) capital surcharge. However, this effect is temporary, as the mean CDS spreads revert to pre-announcement level, dropping sharply after the initial rise. Our analysis contributes to the debate on whether being designated as a G-SIB bank necessarily leads to implicit \"too-big-to-fail\" subsidies. The findings imply that the investors immediately update their beliefs on the systemic risk of the bank after the bucket reallocation announcement and temporarily demand more hedging against systemic risk.","PeriodicalId":10698,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal","volume":"110 3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3581059","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
This paper tests whether an increase or decrease of the capital surcharge for being a global systemically important bank (G-SIB) envisaged by regulators has an impact on the CDS prices of these banks. We find evidence that the CDS spreads of a G-SIB bank increase (decrease) after the announcement of a higher (lower) capital surcharge. However, this effect is temporary, as the mean CDS spreads revert to pre-announcement level, dropping sharply after the initial rise. Our analysis contributes to the debate on whether being designated as a G-SIB bank necessarily leads to implicit "too-big-to-fail" subsidies. The findings imply that the investors immediately update their beliefs on the systemic risk of the bank after the bucket reallocation announcement and temporarily demand more hedging against systemic risk.