Happer: Unpacking Android Apps via a Hardware-Assisted Approach

Lei Xue, Hao Zhou, Xiapu Luo, Yajin Zhou, Yang Shi, G. Gu, Fengwei Zhang, M. Au
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引用次数: 14

Abstract

Malware authors are abusing packers (or runtime-based obfuscators) to protect malicious apps from being analyzed. Although many unpacking tools have been proposed, they can be easily impeded by the anti-analysis methods adopted by the packers, and they fail to effectively collect the hidden Dex data due to the evolving protection strategies of packers. Consequently, many packing behaviors are unknown to analysts and packed malware can circumvent the inspection. To fill the gap, in this paper, we propose a novel hardware-assisted approach that first monitors the packing behaviors and then selects the proper approach to unpack the packed apps. Moreover, we develop a prototype named Happerwith a domain-specific language named behavior description language (BDL) for the ease of extending Happerafter tackling several technical challenges. We conduct extensive experiments with 12 commercial Android packers and more than 24k Android apps to evaluate Happer. The results show that Happerobserved 27 packing behaviors, 17 of which have not been elaborated by previous studies. Based on the observed packing behaviors, Happeradopted proper approaches to collect all the hidden Dex data and assembled them to valid Dex files.
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Happer:通过硬件辅助方法解压Android应用程序
恶意软件的作者滥用打包器(或基于运行时的混淆器)来保护恶意应用程序不被分析。尽管已经提出了许多拆包工具,但它们很容易受到封隔器采用的反分析方法的阻碍,并且由于封隔器保护策略的不断发展,它们无法有效地收集隐藏的Dex数据。因此,许多包装行为对分析人员来说是未知的,并且包装的恶意软件可以绕过检查。为了填补这一空白,在本文中,我们提出了一种新的硬件辅助方法,首先监控打包行为,然后选择合适的方法来解包打包的应用程序。此外,我们开发了一个名为happer的原型,并使用了一种名为行为描述语言(BDL)的领域特定语言,以便在解决了几个技术挑战后轻松扩展happer。我们对12个商业Android打包程序和超过24k个Android应用程序进行了广泛的实验来评估Happer。结果表明,哈珀观察到27种堆积行为,其中17种没有被以前的研究详细阐述。根据观察到的打包行为,happerer采用了适当的方法来收集所有隐藏的Dex数据,并将它们组装成有效的Dex文件。
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