How Much Liquidity Would a Liquidity-saving Mechanism save If a Liquidity-saving Mechanism Could save Liquidity? A Simulation Approach for Canada’s Large-value Payment System

IF 0.4 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures Pub Date : 2020-02-10 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3581600
Shaun Byck, Ronald Heijmans
{"title":"How Much Liquidity Would a Liquidity-saving Mechanism save If a Liquidity-saving Mechanism Could save Liquidity? A Simulation Approach for Canada’s Large-value Payment System","authors":"Shaun Byck, Ronald Heijmans","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3581600","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Canada’s Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) is in the process of being replaced by a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system. A pure RTGS system typically requires participants to hold substantial amounts of intraday liquidity in order to settle their payment obligations. Implementing one or more liquidity-saving mechanisms (LSMs) can reduce the amount of liquidity that participants need to hold. This paper investigates how much liquidity requirements can be reduced with the implementation of different LSMs in the Financial Network Analytics simulation engine using LVTS transaction data from 2018. These LSMs include (1) bilateral offsetting, (2) FIFO–bypass, (3) multilateral offsetting and (4) a combination of all LSMs. We simulate two different scenarios at varying levels of the upper bound of liquidity. In the first scenario, all payments from Tranche 1, which are considered time critical, are settled in a pure RTGS payment stream, while less time-critical Tranche 2 payments are settled in a payment stream with LSMs. In the second scenario, we settle all payments (Tranches 1 and 2) in the LSM stream. Our results show that when there is ample liquidity available in the system, there is minimal benefit from LSMs, as payments are settled without much delay: the effectiveness of LSMs increases as the amount of intraday liquidity decreases. A combination of LSMs shows a reduction in liquidity requirements that is larger than any one individual LSM.<br><br>","PeriodicalId":41226,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2020-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3581600","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4

Abstract

Canada’s Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) is in the process of being replaced by a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system. A pure RTGS system typically requires participants to hold substantial amounts of intraday liquidity in order to settle their payment obligations. Implementing one or more liquidity-saving mechanisms (LSMs) can reduce the amount of liquidity that participants need to hold. This paper investigates how much liquidity requirements can be reduced with the implementation of different LSMs in the Financial Network Analytics simulation engine using LVTS transaction data from 2018. These LSMs include (1) bilateral offsetting, (2) FIFO–bypass, (3) multilateral offsetting and (4) a combination of all LSMs. We simulate two different scenarios at varying levels of the upper bound of liquidity. In the first scenario, all payments from Tranche 1, which are considered time critical, are settled in a pure RTGS payment stream, while less time-critical Tranche 2 payments are settled in a payment stream with LSMs. In the second scenario, we settle all payments (Tranches 1 and 2) in the LSM stream. Our results show that when there is ample liquidity available in the system, there is minimal benefit from LSMs, as payments are settled without much delay: the effectiveness of LSMs increases as the amount of intraday liquidity decreases. A combination of LSMs shows a reduction in liquidity requirements that is larger than any one individual LSM.

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
如果一个流动性储蓄机制能够拯救流动性,那么一个流动性储蓄机制能拯救多少流动性?加拿大大额支付系统的仿真方法
加拿大的大额转账系统(LVTS)正在被实时全额结算(RTGS)系统所取代。一个纯粹的RTGS系统通常要求参与者持有大量的日内流动性,以结算他们的支付义务。实施一个或多个流动性节约机制(LSMs)可以减少参与者需要持有的流动性数量。本文使用2018年的LVTS交易数据,研究了在金融网络分析模拟引擎中实现不同的lsm可以降低多少流动性需求。这些lsm包括(1)双边抵消,(2)fifo旁路,(3)多边抵消和(4)所有lsm的组合。我们在流动性上限的不同水平上模拟了两种不同的情景。在第一个场景中,所有来自Tranche 1的支付(被认为是时间关键的)都在纯RTGS支付流中结算,而时间不那么关键的Tranche 2支付则在带有lsm的支付流中结算。在第二个场景中,我们结算LSM流中的所有付款(第1和第2部分)。我们的研究结果表明,当系统中有充足的流动性时,lsm的收益最小,因为付款结算没有太多延迟:lsm的有效性随着日内流动性的减少而增加。LSM的组合显示流动性需求的减少比任何单个LSM都要大。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
6
期刊最新文献
Construction of hypothetical scenarios for central counterparty stress tests using vine copulas A cost–benefit analysis of anti-procyclicality: analyzing approaches to procyclicality reduction in central counterparty initial margin models Industry adoption scenarios for authoritative data stores using the International Swaps and Derivatives Association Common Domain Model Climate risk and central counterparty risk management Procyclicality of central counterparty margin models: systemic problems need systemic approaches
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1