{"title":"The Impacts of the Lifeline Subsidy on High-Speed Internet Access","authors":"Samara Mendez, Gabor Molnar, Scott J. Savage","doi":"10.1086/714504","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper evaluates the impacts of the Lifeline subsidy on high-speed Internet prices, demand, and welfare. Results show that low-income households would require large price reductions to subscribe to basic broadband. Simulations of competition between cable and telephone firms show that the $9.25 subsidy lowers the prices for low-quality plans and incentivizes about 6 percent of low-income households to take up high-speed Internet. When firms price discriminate by charging different prices to low- and high-income households choosing the same plan, about 25 percent of low-income households enter the market and consume high-speed Internet. When the social planner sets prices and price discriminates, 68 percent of low-income households enter the market, and more higher-speed plans are consumed.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"12 1","pages":"745 - 782"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Journal of Law and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/714504","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
This paper evaluates the impacts of the Lifeline subsidy on high-speed Internet prices, demand, and welfare. Results show that low-income households would require large price reductions to subscribe to basic broadband. Simulations of competition between cable and telephone firms show that the $9.25 subsidy lowers the prices for low-quality plans and incentivizes about 6 percent of low-income households to take up high-speed Internet. When firms price discriminate by charging different prices to low- and high-income households choosing the same plan, about 25 percent of low-income households enter the market and consume high-speed Internet. When the social planner sets prices and price discriminates, 68 percent of low-income households enter the market, and more higher-speed plans are consumed.