{"title":"How Worried Should I be About Zombies?","authors":"Christopher Preston","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2071556","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Eric Katz says the arguments for deextinction are depressingly familiar . . . and he’s right! The creation – or recreation – of ‘necrofauna,’ he says, ‘recycles old issues and debates in the field’ (p. 2). Many of the debates are ones in which Katz has played a prominent role. The same positions he has deployed against restoration and against geoengineering remain viable in the case of deextinction. ‘Arguments that already exist in the field of environmental philosophy can,’ he says, ‘ . . . serve as foundational criticisms of the process’ (p. 2). The question I wish to entertain is whether the fact there are zombies in the room is enough. Even if Katz is right about the haunt of familiar arguments and tropes, does this settle the question of how best to argue against deextinction? The question particularly interests me because it applies as much to some of what I have written against these types of technology as it does to Katz.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"73 1","pages":"129 - 131"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ethics Policy & Environment","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2071556","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Eric Katz says the arguments for deextinction are depressingly familiar . . . and he’s right! The creation – or recreation – of ‘necrofauna,’ he says, ‘recycles old issues and debates in the field’ (p. 2). Many of the debates are ones in which Katz has played a prominent role. The same positions he has deployed against restoration and against geoengineering remain viable in the case of deextinction. ‘Arguments that already exist in the field of environmental philosophy can,’ he says, ‘ . . . serve as foundational criticisms of the process’ (p. 2). The question I wish to entertain is whether the fact there are zombies in the room is enough. Even if Katz is right about the haunt of familiar arguments and tropes, does this settle the question of how best to argue against deextinction? The question particularly interests me because it applies as much to some of what I have written against these types of technology as it does to Katz.