Financial Innovation, Regulation, and Reform

Q3 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Cato Journal Pub Date : 2009-01-01 DOI:10.7916/D87M0JFV
C. Calomiris
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引用次数: 128

Abstract

Financial innovations often respond to regulation by sidestepping regulatory restrictions that would otherwise limit activities in which people wish to engage. Securitization of loans (e.g., credit card receivables, or subprime residential mortgages) is often portrayed, correctly, as having arisen in part as a means of "arbitraging" regulatory capital requirements by booking assets off the balance sheets of regulated banks. Originators of the loans were able to maintain lower equity capital against those loans than they otherwise would have needed to maintain if the loans had been placed on their balance sheets. (1) Capital regulation of securitization invited this form of off-balance-sheet regulatory arbitrage, and did so quite consciously. Several of the capital requirement rules for the treatment of securitized assets originated by banks, and for the debts issued by those conduits and held or guaranteed by banks, were specifically and consciously designed to permit banks to allocate less capital against their risks if they had been held on their balance sheets (Calomiris 2008a). Critics of these capital regulations have rightly pointed to these capital requirements as having contributed to the subprime crisis by permitting banks to maintain insufficient amounts of equity capital per unit of risk undertaken in their subprime holdings. Investment banks were also permitted by capital regulations that were less strict than those applying to commercial banks to engage in subprime-related risk with insufficient budgeting of equity capital. Investment banks faced capital regulations under SEC guidelines that were similar to the more permissive Basel II rules that apply to commercial banks outside the United States. Because those capital regulations were less strict than capital regulations imposed on U.S. banks, investment banks were able to lever their positions snore than commercial banks. Investment banks' use of overnight repurchase agreements as their primary source of finance also permitted them to "ride the yield curve" when using debt to fund their risky asset positions; in that respect, collateralized repos appeared to offer a substitute for low-interest commercial bank deposits. (2) But as the collateral standing behind those repos declined in value and became risky, "haircuts" associated with repo collateral became less favorable, and investment banks were unable to roll over their repos positions, a liquidity risk that added to their vulnerability and made their equity capital positions even more insufficient as risk buffers. There is no doubt that the financial innovations associated with securitization and repo finance were at least in part motivated by regulatory arbitrage. Furthermore, there is no doubt that if on-balance-sheet commercial bank capital regulations had determined the amount of equity budgeted by all subprime mortgage originators, then the leverage ratios of the banking system would not have been as large, and the liquidity risk from repo funding would have been substantially less, both of which would have contributed to reducing the magnitude of the financial crisis. And yet, I do not agree with those who argue that the subprime crisis is mainly a story of government "errors of omission," which allowed banks to avoid regulatory discipline due to the insufficient application of existing on-balance-sheet commercial bank capital regulations to the risks undertaken by investment banks and off-balance-sheet conduits. The main story of the subprime crisis instead is one of government "errors of commission," which were far more important in generating the huge risks and large losses that brought down the U.S. financial system. What Went Wrong and Why? The subprime crisis reflected first and foremost the willingness of the managers of large financial institutions to take on risks by buying financial instruments that were improperly priced, which made the purchases of these instruments contrary to the interests of the shareholders of the institutions that invested in them. …
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金融创新、监管和改革
金融创新通常通过避开监管限制来应对监管,否则这些限制将限制人们希望参与的活动。贷款证券化(例如,信用卡应收账款或次级住宅抵押贷款)经常被正确地描述为部分作为“套利”监管资本要求的一种手段,通过将资产记在受监管银行的资产负债表之外。这些贷款的发起人能够维持较低的权益资本,而如果这些贷款被放在他们的资产负债表上,他们就需要维持较低的权益资本。(1)资产证券化的资本监管招致了这种表外监管套利,而且是有意识地这样做的。处理由银行发起的证券化资产,以及由这些渠道发行并由银行持有或担保的债务的一些资本要求规则,是专门和有意识地设计的,允许银行在资产负债表上持有的情况下分配较少的资本来应对风险(Calomiris 2008a)。这些资本监管的批评者正确地指出,这些资本要求导致了次贷危机,因为它们允许银行在其持有的次贷所承担的每单位风险中保持不足的股本。投资银行还被允许在没有充分的权益资本预算的情况下,从事与次贷相关的风险。在美国证券交易委员会的指导下,投资银行面临的资本监管类似于适用于美国以外商业银行的更为宽松的《巴塞尔协议II》(Basel II)规定。由于这些资本监管没有对美国银行的资本监管那么严格,投资银行能够比商业银行更有效地杠杆化自己的头寸。投资银行使用隔夜回购协议作为主要融资来源,也使它们能够在利用债务为其风险资产头寸融资时“利用收益率曲线”;在这方面,抵押回购似乎是低利率商业银行存款的替代品。(2)但是,随着这些回购背后的抵押品价值下降并变得有风险,与回购抵押品相关的“削发”变得不那么有利,投资银行无法对其回购头寸进行展期,这种流动性风险增加了它们的脆弱性,并使它们的权益资本头寸更不足以作为风险缓冲。毫无疑问,与证券化和回购融资相关的金融创新,至少在一定程度上是受到监管套利的驱动。此外,毫无疑问,如果表内商业银行资本监管规定了所有次级抵押贷款发起人预算的股本金额,那么银行体系的杠杆率就不会那么高,回购融资的流动性风险也会大大降低,这两者都将有助于减轻金融危机的严重程度。然而,我不同意那些认为次贷危机主要是政府“疏忽的错误”的人的观点,由于现有的表内商业银行资本监管对投资银行和表外渠道承担的风险的应用不足,这使得银行得以逃避监管纪律。相反,次贷危机的主要故事是政府的“操作失误”,这在造成巨大风险和巨额损失、拖垮美国金融体系方面要重要得多。出了什么问题,为什么?次贷危机首先反映了大型金融机构的管理者愿意承担风险,购买定价不合理的金融工具,这使得购买这些工具违背了投资这些工具的机构股东的利益。…
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Cato Journal Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
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