A New Crime for Corporate Misconduct?

Peter J. Henning
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

Federal prosecutors have explained the absence of any signature prosecutions of financial executives in the wake of the financial crisis to the high level of intent required by criminal laws typically used to prosecute economic crimes. If the barrier to holding individual executives is the lack of evidence of specific intent, the one possibility is to adopt a new crime based on recklessness for executive decisions that result in significant harm. In this essay, I look at how statutes in Germany and the United Kingdom shed light on how a provision can be crafted to hold senior managers responsible for reckless corporate decisions. But the question remains whether such a new law is needed in the wake of the financial crisis, and whether it would deter the type of risk taking expected in a business enterprise seeking a high return on capital.
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企业不当行为新罪名?
联邦检察官解释说,金融危机之后没有任何针对金融高管的签名起诉,是因为通常用于起诉经济犯罪的刑法所要求的意图很高。如果拘留个别高管的障碍是缺乏具体意图的证据,那么一种可能性是根据导致重大损害的高管决策的鲁莽采取一种新的犯罪。在这篇文章中,我考察了德国和英国的法规如何阐明了如何制定一项条款,让高级管理人员对鲁莽的公司决策负责。但问题仍然是,在金融危机之后,是否需要这样一项新法律,以及它是否会阻止企业寻求高资本回报所预期的那种冒险行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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