Improved boomerang attacks on round-reduced SM3 and keyed permutation of BLAKE-256

D. Bai, Hongbo Yu, Gaoli Wang, Xiaoyun Wang
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引用次数: 11

Abstract

In this study, the authors study the security of hash functions SM3 and BLAKE-256 against boomerang attack. SM3 is designed by Wang et al. and published by Chinese Commercial Cryptography Administration Office for the use of electronic certification service system in China. BLAKE is one of the five finalists of the NIST SHA-3 competition submitted by Aumasson et al. For SM3, they present boomerang distinguishers for the compression function reduced to 34/35/36/37 steps out of 64 steps, with time complexities 231.4, 233.6, 273.4 and 2192, respectively. Then, they show some incompatible problems existed in the previous boomerang attacks on SM3. Meanwhile, they launch boomerang attacks on up to 7- and 8-round keyed permutation of BLAKE-256, which are the first valid 7-round and 8-round boomerangs for BLAKE-256. Especially, since the author's distinguishers on 34/35-steps compression function of SM3 and 7-round keyed permutation of BLAKE-256 are practical, they are able to obtain boomerang quartets of these attacks. As far as they know, these are the best results against round-reduced SM3 and BLAKE-256.
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改进了对round-reduced SM3和BLAKE-256键化排列的回旋镖攻击
在本研究中,作者研究了哈希函数SM3和BLAKE-256对回旋镖攻击的安全性。SM3由Wang等人设计,由中国商业密码管理办公室发布,供中国电子认证服务系统使用。BLAKE是Aumasson等人提交的NIST SHA-3竞赛的五个决赛选手之一。对于SM3,他们给出了回弹区分器,压缩函数在64步中减少到34/35/36/37步,时间复杂度分别为231.4、233.6、273.4和2192。在此基础上,分析了以往针对SM3的回旋镖攻击存在的一些不兼容问题。同时,他们对BLAKE-256的最多7轮和8轮键控排列发起回旋镖攻击,这是BLAKE-256的第一个有效的7轮和8轮回旋镖。特别是,由于作者对SM3的34/35步压缩函数和BLAKE-256的7轮键置换的区分是实用的,因此能够得到这些攻击的回旋四重奏。据他们所知,这是针对round-reduced SM3和BLAKE-256的最佳结果。
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