Judges’ Race and the Voting Rights Act: Perceived Expertise in Three-Judge District Court Panels

Abstract

Abstract Work on the Courts of Appeals has found that judges adjust their behavior based on the judges with whom they serve. These “panel effects” are traditionally described in terms of preferences, with the effect of a judge’s ideology conditioned by the preferences of other judges on the panel. Additionally, prior work has observed panel effects based in demographic diversity. The theoretical argument offered by this work is that white, male judges learn from the personal experiences of their nonwhite and female colleagues, becoming more receptive to claims of discrimination. This learning is facilitated in the Courts of Appeals because of the repeated interactions of circuit court judges. What happens when collegiality based on repeated interactions is disrupted and deciding cases together happens only on a single case? This is the context of three-judge district court panels, which hear cases involving the Voting Rights Act. Decisions of these panels can be appealed directly to the Supreme Court, creating added pressure to make correct decisions, yet providing little opportunity for judges to learn from their colleagues. We find that race-based panel effects in this context are quite strong, but the mechanism through which they work is different than on circuit court panels. When serving with nonwhite judges, white judges appear to take their cue on how to vote from their nonwhite colleagues. Our results suggest that white judges in this context assume an expertise on the part of their nonwhite colleagues by virtue of their race. These findings potentially have important implications for the way we understand the effects of demographic diversity on judicial behavior.