{"title":"Equilibrium analysis of dynamic bidding in sponsored search auctions","authors":"Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Daniel M. Reeves","doi":"10.1504/IJEB.2008.018071","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We analyze symmetric pure strategy equilibria in dynamic sponsored search auction games using simulations by restricting the strategies to several in a class introduced by Cary et al. [1]. We show that a particular convergent strategy also exhibits high stability to deviations. On the other hand, a strategy which yields high payoffs to all players is not sustainable in equilibrium play. Additionally, we analyze a repeated game in which each stage is a static complete-information sponsored search game. In this setting, we demonstrate a collusion strategy which yields high payoffs to all players and empirically show it to be sustainable over a range of settings.","PeriodicalId":37970,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Electronic Business","volume":"25 3 1","pages":"155-166"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"44","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Electronic Business","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJEB.2008.018071","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Business, Management and Accounting","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 44
Abstract
We analyze symmetric pure strategy equilibria in dynamic sponsored search auction games using simulations by restricting the strategies to several in a class introduced by Cary et al. [1]. We show that a particular convergent strategy also exhibits high stability to deviations. On the other hand, a strategy which yields high payoffs to all players is not sustainable in equilibrium play. Additionally, we analyze a repeated game in which each stage is a static complete-information sponsored search game. In this setting, we demonstrate a collusion strategy which yields high payoffs to all players and empirically show it to be sustainable over a range of settings.
期刊介绍：
IJEB is a double-blind refereed and authoritative reference dealing with working and potential e-business models and applications as well as emerging issues of interest to professionals and academics. Topics covered include: Assessing e-business potential, Business portals, e-commerce/business management, Distributed/collaborative product development, E-banking/finance/investment, secured electronic transactions, E-business ethics and strategies, E-delivery/branding/entrepreneurship/services/trade, e-tailing, E-education/learning/government/medicine, Global trade and e-business, Intelligent web services, mobile Internet business, semantic webs, Intellectual property protection, knowledge networks, Multilateral facilitation of e-business, role of intermediaries, New business models/enabling technologies, e-businesses trends, Regulating distortions and cyber frauds, money laundering prevention, Valuating electronic business assets, financing e-business, Virtual businesses, virtualisation and globalisation of services. The objectives of the IJEB are to develop, promote and coordinate the development and practice of electronic business methods. It also aims to help professionals working in the field, business educators and policy-makers to contribute, to disseminate information and to learn from each other|s work. The international dimension is emphasised in order to overcome cultural and national barriers and to meet the needs of accelerating technological change and changes in the global economy.
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