Security-Aware Synthesis of Human-UAV Protocols

Abstract

In this work, we synthesize collaboration protocols for human-unmanned aerial vehicle (H-UAV) command and control systems, where the human operator aids in securing the UAV by intermittently performing geolocation tasks to confirm its reported location. We first present a stochastic game-based model for the system that accounts for both the operator and an adversary capable of launching stealthy false-data injection attacks, causing the UAV to deviate from its path. We also describe a synthesis challenge due to the UAV’s hidden-information constraint. Next, we perform human experiments using a developed RESCHU-SA testbed to recognize the geolocation strategies that operators adopt. Furthermore, we deploy machine learning techniques on the collected experimental data to predict the correctness of a geolocation task at a given location based on its geographical features. By representing the model as a delayed-action game and formalizing the system objectives, we utilize off-the-shelf model checkers to synthesize protocols for the human-UAV coalition that satisfy these objectives. Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of the H-UAV protocol synthesis through a case study where the protocols are experimentally analyzed and further evaluated by human operators.