The issue of anthropocentrism in ethics

Evandro Agazzi
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Criticism against “anthropocentrism” has become frequent in recent bioethical literature, especially after the increasing favor enjoyed by animal ethics and environmental ethics. In an action there is usually an acting subject and an object that is affected by the action. Moral responsibility only concerns the subject and it is clear that only subjects endowed with the capability of understanding and deciding can be morally responsible. In this world only humans have such capability; therefore, only man is a moral subject and can have duties in a proper sense. These duties regard man's conduct towards the object of an action, and ‘traditional ethics’ distinguished duties towards God, oneself and others (therefore not only man was the object of moral duties). In ethics a reciprocity’ between duties and rights is often recognized: one has a duty towards someone which has the right to receive a certain treatment and is in principle morally obliged to reciprocate this treatment. The concept of responsibility, however does not entail reciprocity: we may be responsible towards beings that do not have the same duties towards us. In such a way it is ethically right to admit that we have duties also towards animals, environment, future generations, that have no rights in a strict sense, and cannot reciprocate our care for them, We can say that, in this sense, man is not the only ‘moral object’ (i.e. the object of moral duties). This position is even better expressed through the moral category of respect. In this perspective it is possible to recognize to man a particularly high position in the ‘ontological hierarchy’ of the existing beings, without making of it the only morally relevant object. This amounts to the imperative not to destroy or damage any form of existence without an adequate reason, and this is why not whatever interest of man can morally justify damaging other forms of existence, but only according to a reasonable judgment of necessity and proportionality.

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伦理学中的人类中心主义问题
对“人类中心主义”的批评在最近的生物伦理学文献中变得频繁,特别是在动物伦理学和环境伦理学越来越受青睐之后。在一个动作中,通常有一个起作用的主语和一个受动作影响的宾语。道德责任只涉及主体,很明显,只有被赋予理解和决策能力的主体才能承担道德责任。在这个世界上只有人类有这样的能力;因此,只有人是道德主体,才能有适当意义上的义务。这些义务涉及人对行为对象的行为,而“传统伦理”区分了对上帝、自己和他人的义务(因此,不仅人是道德义务的对象)。在伦理学中,义务和权利之间的互惠是经常被承认的:一个人对有权接受某种待遇的人有义务,原则上在道德上有义务回报这种待遇。然而,责任的概念并不包含互惠:我们可能对那些对我们没有同样义务的生物负责。在这种意义上,承认我们对动物、环境、后代也有义务是合乎伦理的,严格意义上说,它们没有权利,也不能回报我们对它们的关心。我们可以说,在这种意义上,人不是唯一的“道德对象”(即道德义务的对象)。这一立场通过尊重这一道德范畴得到了更好的表达。从这个角度来看,有可能认识到人类在现存生物的“本体论层次”中处于一个特别高的位置,而不是使其成为唯一与道德相关的对象。这就意味着,在没有充分理由的情况下,不能摧毁或破坏任何形式的存在,这就是为什么人类的任何利益都不能在道德上证明破坏其他形式的存在是正当的,而只能根据必要性和相称性的合理判断。
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