Enhanced cyber-physical security using attack-resistant cyber nodes and event-triggered moving target defence

IF 1.7 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory and Applications Pub Date : 2021-03-10 DOI:10.1049/cps2.12002
Martin Higgins, Keith Mayes, Fei Teng
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

A cyber-physical authentication strategy to protect power system infrastructure against false data injection (FDI) attacks is outlined. The authors demonstrate that it is feasible to use small, low-cost, yet highly attack-resistant security chips as measurement nodes, enhanced with an event-triggered moving target defence (MTD), to offer effective cyber-physical security. At the cyber layer, the proposed solution is based on the MULTOS Trust-Anchor chip, using an authenticated encryption protocol, offering cryptographically protected and chained reports at up to 12/s. The availability of the Trust-Anchors allows the grid controller to delegate aspects of passive anomaly detection, supporting local as well as central alarms. In this context, a distributed event-triggered MTD protocol is implemented at the physical layer to complement cyber side enhancement. This protocol applies a distributed anomaly detection scheme based on Holt-Winters seasonal forecasting in combination with MTD implemented via inductance perturbation. The scheme is shown to be effective at preventing or detecting a wide range of attacks against power system measurement system.

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使用抗攻击网络节点和事件触发移动目标防御增强网络物理安全性
提出了一种保护电力系统基础设施免受虚假数据注入(FDI)攻击的网络物理认证策略。作者证明,使用小型,低成本,但高度抗攻击的安全芯片作为测量节点是可行的,并通过事件触发移动目标防御(MTD)增强,以提供有效的网络物理安全。在网络层,提出的解决方案基于MULTOS Trust-Anchor芯片,使用经过认证的加密协议,提供高达12/s的加密保护和链式报告。trust - anchor的可用性允许网格控制器委托被动异常检测的各个方面,支持本地和中央警报。在这种情况下,在物理层实现了分布式事件触发MTD协议,以补充网络侧增强。该协议采用了一种基于冬冬季节预报的分布式异常检测方案,并结合了电感扰动实现的MTD。该方案可有效防止或检测针对电力系统测量系统的各种攻击。
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来源期刊
IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory and Applications
IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory and Applications Computer Science-Computer Networks and Communications
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
6.70%
发文量
17
审稿时长
19 weeks
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