{"title":"Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange","authors":"Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We analyze centralized markets for indivisible objects without money through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We consider rules that for each profile of agents preferences select an assignment of the objects to the agents. We present a family of domains of preferences (<em>minimal reversal domains</em>) that are maximal rich domains for the existence of rules that satisfy <em>individual rationality</em>, <em>efficiency</em>, and <em>strategy-proofness</em>. Each minimal reversal domain is defined by a common ranking of the set of objects, and agents’ preferences over admissible objects coincide with such common ranking but for a specific pair of objects.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"126 ","pages":"Pages 107-118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Mathematical Social Sciences","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489623000860","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We analyze centralized markets for indivisible objects without money through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We consider rules that for each profile of agents preferences select an assignment of the objects to the agents. We present a family of domains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) that are maximal rich domains for the existence of rules that satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Each minimal reversal domain is defined by a common ranking of the set of objects, and agents’ preferences over admissible objects coincide with such common ranking but for a specific pair of objects.
期刊介绍：
The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences.
Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models.
Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
