Endogenous reference price auctions for a diverse set of commodities: an experimental analysis.

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-03-30 DOI:10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6

Olivier Armantier, Charles A Holt

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper is concerned with multi-object, multi-unit auctions with a budget constrained auctioneer who has noisy value estimates for each object. We propose a new allocation mechanism, the endogenous reference price auction, with two key features. First, bids are normalized across objects using "reference prices." Second, reference prices are set endogenously using information extracted from the bids submitted. We report on an experiment showing that a simple endogenous process mitigates value inaccuracies and improves three performance measures: the seller's profit, allocative efficiency and total surplus. These results have important implications for large auctions used in practice.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6.

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多种商品的内生参考价格拍卖：实验分析。

本文研究了一个预算受限的拍卖师对每个对象进行有噪声的价值估计的多对象、多单元拍卖。我们提出了一种新的分配机制，内生参考价格拍卖，具有两个关键特征。首先，使用“参考价格”对各对象的投标进行标准化。其次，使用从提交的投标中提取的信息内生地设置参考价格。我们报告了一项实验，该实验表明，一个简单的内生过程可以缓解价值不准确，并改善三个绩效指标：卖方利润、配置效率和总盈余。这些结果对实践中使用的大型拍卖具有重要意义。补充信息：在线版本包含补充材料，请访问10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Experimental Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

4.10

自引率

8.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： Experimental methods are uniquely suited to the study of many phenomena that have been difficult to observe directly in naturally occurring economic contexts. For example, the ability to induce preferences and control information structures makes it possible to isolate the effects of alternate economic structures, policies, and market institutions.Experimental Economics is an international journal that serves the growing group of economists around the world who use experimental methods. The journal invites high-quality papers in any area of experimental research in economics and related fields (i.e. accounting, finance, political science, and the psychology of decision making). State-of-the-art theoretical work and econometric work that is motivated by experimental data is also encouraged. The journal will also consider articles with a primary focus on methodology or replication of controversial findings. We welcome experiments conducted in either the laboratory or in the field. The relevant data can be decisions or non-choice data such as physiological measurements. However, we only consider studies that do not employ deception of participants and in which participants are incentivized. Experimental Economics is structured to promote experimental economics by bringing together innovative research that meets professional standards of experimental method, but without editorial bias towards specific orientations. All papers will be reviewed through the standard, anonymous-referee procedure and all accepted manuscripts will be subject to the approval of two editors. Authors must submit the instructions that participants in their study received at the time of submission of their manuscript. Authors are expected to submit separate data appendices which will be attached to the journal''s web page upon publication. Officially cited as: Exp Econ

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