Culpability for offenses in frontotemporal dementia and other brain disorders

Abstract

The responsibility of persons with brain disorders who commit offenses may depend on how their disorders alter brain mechanisms for culpability. Criminal behavior can result from brain disorders that alter social cognition including a neuromoral system of intuitive moral emotions that are absolute (deontological) normative codes and that includes an emotion-mediated evaluation of intentionality. This neuromoral system has its hub in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) with other frontal, anterior temporal-amygdalar, insular, and right temporoparietal connections. Among brain disorders, investigators report offenses in persons with brain tumors, epilepsy, and traumatic brain injury, but it is those with a form of dementia with VMPFC pathology, behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), who are most prone to criminal behavior. This review presents four new patients with bvFTD who were interviewed after committing offenses. These patients knew the nature of their acts and the wrongness of the type of action but lacked substantial capacity to experience the criminality of their conduct at the intuitive, deontological, moral emotional level. Disease in VMPFC and its amygdalar connections may impair moral emotions in these patients. These findings recommend evaluation for the experience of moral emotions and VMPFC-amygdala dysfunction among persons with antisocial behavior, with or without brain disease.