Research on the evolution of supervision strategy of renewable energy+energy storage under China's carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goal.

Abstract

The renewable energy+energy storage model has an important role to play in achieving China's proposal of the carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goal. In order to study the development mechanism of renewable energy+storage cooperation with government participation, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model among government, renewable energy generators, and energy storage service suppliers, based on the data of a renewable energy+storage project in a Chinese province. In this paper, we analyze the game process and the factors affecting the behavioral strategies of the three parties through numerical simulation. The study shows that the government regulation has a positive effect on the cooperative development of renewable energy+energy storage, and it can effectively restrain the wasteful phenomenon of renewable energy generation by means of punishment and improve the operating income of cooperative projects by means of subsidies, which can help the enterprises to broaden the application scenarios of energy storage. The government can effectively promote the improvement of renewable energy+energy storage cooperation mechanism by formulating regulatory mechanism, controlling the cost of supervision, and dynamically adjusting the intensity of supervision. Therefore, the research in this paper not only enriches the research related to renewable energy+energy storage mode but also provides valuable reference for the government to formulate regulatory policies related to renewable energy+energy storage.