情感破坏性的认知价值。

IF 1.3 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.1007/s11245-021-09788-5
Imke von Maur
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引用次数: 6

摘要

为了探索情感如何对理解复杂的社会文化特定现象的意义做出积极或消极的贡献,我认为我们必须考虑情感的习惯维度——即,一个有情感的人在其情感传记过程中获得的情感库。这揭示了与情感意向性相关的某种形式的一致性,这是理解为什么人类以他们的方式理解情况以及为什么通常很难以不同的方式理解事物的关键。一个关键的认知问题是,主体往往甚至没有进入一个理解的过程,也就是说,他们甚至没有开始以不同于熟悉的方式考虑特定的对象、理论、环境、其他存在等。因此,争论的认识论问题在于对事物被认为正确的方式的毫无疑问的信念。通过承认情感意向性的习惯维度,我分析了这种无能为力的原因,并建议具有情感破坏性和培养多元情感库是克服这一认知问题的关键能力。
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The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability.

In order to explore how emotions contribute positively or negatively to understanding the meaning of complex socio-culturally specific phenomena, I argue that we must take into account the habitual dimension of emotions - i.e., the emotion repertoire that a feeling person acquires in the course of their affective biography. This brings to light a certain form of alignment in relation to affective intentionality that is key to comprehending why humans understand situations in the way they do and why it so often is especially hard to understand things differently. A crucial epistemic problem is that subjects often do not even enter a process of understanding, i.e., they do not even start to consider a specific object, theory, circumstance, other being, etc. in different ways than the familiar one. The epistemic problem at issue thus lies in an unquestioned faith in things being right the way they are taken to be. By acknowledging the habitual dimension of affective intentionality, I analyze reasons for this inability and suggest that being affectively disruptable and cultivating a pluralistic emotion repertoire are crucial abilities to overcome this epistemic problem.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.10
自引率
7.10%
发文量
47
期刊介绍: Topoi''s main assumption is that philosophy is a lively, provocative, delightful activity, which constantly challenges our received views, relentlessly questions our inherited habits, painstakingly elaborates on how things could be different, in other stories, in counterfactual situations, in alternative possible worlds. Whatever its ideology, whether with the intent of uncovering a truer structure of reality or of soothing our anxiety, of exposing myths or of following them through, the outcome of philosophical activity is always the destabilizing, unsettling generation of doubts, of objections, of criticisms. It follows that this activity is intrinsically a ''dialogue'', that philosophy is first and foremost philosophical discussion, that it requires bringing out conflicting points of view, paying careful, sympathetic attention to their structure, and using this dialectic to articulate one''s approach, to make it richer, more thoughtful, more open to variation and play. And it follows that the spirit which one brings to this activity must be one of tolerance, of always suspecting one''s own blindness and consequently looking with unbiased eye in every corner, without fearing to pass a (fallible) judgment on what is there but also without failing to show interest and respect. Topoi''s structure is a direct expression of this view. To maximize discussion, we devote most or all of this issue to a single topic. And, since discussion is only interesting when it is conducted seriously and responsibly, we usually request the collaboration of a guest-editor, an expert who will identify contributors and interact with them in a constructive way. Because we do not feel tied to any definite philosophical theme (or set of them), we choose the topic with absolute freedom, looking for what is blossoming and thriving, occasionally betting on what might - partly through our attention - ''begin'' to blossom and thrive. And because we do not want our structur e to become our own straightjacket, we are open to contributions not fitting the ''topos'', and do not rule out in principle the possibility of topic-less issues.
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