社会学习实验中的内群体偏见。

IF 1.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.1007/s10683-022-09788-1
Wenbo Zou, Xue Xu
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引用次数: 1

摘要

社会学习和随后的私人信息处理是否会因观察者是否与其行为被观察的前任具有相同的群体身份而有所不同?在本文中,我们进行了一个实验室实验来回答这个问题,在实验中,受试者首先观察到一个社会信号,然后接收到一个私人信号。我们发现,如果被试者在实验环境中与被试者有相同的群体认同,他们会更重视社会信号。我们还提供了启发性的证据,表明这种群体内和群体外的差异不能用个体对前任理性的信念来解释。此外,群体认同的异质效应存在于对随后的私人信号的权重上:相比于前辈是外群体时,那些从内群体前辈那里学习过的人,如果私人信号与社会信号相矛盾(证实),就会给予更大(更小)的权重。我们推测,这种群体效应与群体认同作为框架装置在社会信号阶段带来某种决策启发的观点是一致的,而这种决策启发在私人信号阶段不再存在。补充信息:在线版本包含补充资料,下载地址:10.1007/s10683-022-09788-1。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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Ingroup bias in a social learning experiment.

Does social learning and subsequent private information processing differ depending on whether the observer shares the same group identity as the predecessor whose action is observed? In this paper, we conduct a lab experiment to answer this question, in which subjects first observe a social signal and then receive a private signal. We find that subjects put greater weights on the social signal if they share with the predecessor the same group identity that is induced in the experimental environment. We also provide suggestive evidence that such an ingroup-outgroup difference cannot be explained by individuals' beliefs of the predecessor's rationality. Moreover, heterogeneous effects of group identity exist in weights given to the subsequent private signal: Compared to when the predecessor is an outgroup, those who have learned from an ingroup predecessor put a greater (smaller) weight on the private signal if it contradicts (confirms) the social signal. We conjecture that such group effects are consistent with the perspective that group identity works as a framing device and brings about certain decision heuristics in the social signal phase, which no longer exist in the private signal phase.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09788-1.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
8.70%
发文量
40
期刊介绍: Experimental methods are uniquely suited to the study of many phenomena that have been difficult to observe directly in naturally occurring economic contexts. For example, the ability to induce preferences and control information structures makes it possible to isolate the effects of alternate economic structures, policies, and market institutions.Experimental Economics is an international journal that serves the growing group of economists around the world who use experimental methods. The journal invites high-quality papers in any area of experimental research in economics and related fields (i.e. accounting, finance, political science, and the psychology of decision making). State-of-the-art theoretical work and econometric work that is motivated by experimental data is also encouraged. The journal will also consider articles with a primary focus on methodology or replication of controversial findings. We welcome experiments conducted in either the laboratory or in the field. The relevant data can be decisions or non-choice data such as physiological measurements. However, we only consider studies that do not employ deception of participants and in which participants are incentivized.  Experimental Economics is structured to promote experimental economics by bringing together innovative research that meets professional standards of experimental method, but without editorial bias towards specific orientations. All papers will be reviewed through the standard, anonymous-referee procedure and all accepted manuscripts will be subject to the approval of two editors. Authors must submit the instructions that participants in their study received at the time of submission of their manuscript. Authors are expected to submit separate data appendices which will be attached to the journal''s web page upon publication. Officially cited as: Exp Econ
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