强大的独立董事

IF 2.9 3区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Financial Management Pub Date : 2021-05-25 DOI:10.1111/fima.12365
Kathy Fogel, Liping Ma, Randall Morck
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引用次数: 0

摘要

股东估值在经济上和统计上都与独立董事权力呈正相关,这是通过综合社会网络权力中心性指标来衡量的。强势独立董事的突然死亡显著降低了股东价值;其他独立董事的死亡则不然,这与强大的独立董事提高公司估值的情况相一致。进一步的测试将更强大的独立董事与更少的破坏价值的并购、更少的自由现金流保留、更多的CEO问责制和更少的盈余管理联系起来。我们将这些发现解释为更强大的独立董事能更好地发现和应对CEO的失误,因为他们能更好地获取信息,在挑战犯错的高管方面有更大的可信度,或者两者兼而有之。
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Powerful independent directors

Shareholder valuations are economically and statistically positively correlated with independent director power, gauged by a composite of social network power centrality measures. Powerful independent directors’ sudden deaths reduce shareholder value significantly; other independent directors’ deaths do not, consistent with powerful independent directors increasing firm valuations. Further tests associate more powerful independent directors with less value-destroying mergers and acquisitions, less free cash flow retention, more CEO accountability, and less earnings management. We interpret these findings as more powerful independent directors better detecting and countering CEO missteps because of better access to information, greater credibility in challenging errant top managers, or both.

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来源期刊
Financial Management
Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: Financial Management (FM) serves both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of nonfinancial businesses, financial institutions, and public or private not-for-profit organizations.
期刊最新文献
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