当董事会使用关联方:外包与退休基金绩效

K. Liu, E. Ooi
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引用次数: 5

摘要

养老基金将主要的基金职能大量外包给服务提供商,这些服务提供商在养老基金的运营中发挥着至关重要的作用,并影响着澳大利亚人的退休储蓄。我们研究了关联方服务提供商的使用和受托人-董事关系对投资绩效的影响。我们发现,当使用关联方服务提供商时,盈利基金的表现明显不佳。当董事会由更多的关联受托人-董事控制并且属于垂直整合的企业集团时,表现不佳的情况更为严重。我们的研究结果引起了人们的关注,即最近的监管改革增加了受托人-董事的职责,是否有效地解决了关联方服务提供商安排中固有的利益冲突。
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When Boards Use Related Parties: Outsourcing and Superannuation Fund Performance
Superannuation funds heavily outsource key fund functions to service providers who play a crucial role in superannuation fund operations and affecting Australians’ retirement savings. We examine the impact of related party service provider usage and trustee‐director affiliation on investment performance. We find that for‐profit funds significantly underperform when using related party service providers. The underperformance is more severe when the board is controlled by more affiliated trustee‐directors and belongs to a vertically integrated conglomerate group. Our results raise concerns about whether recent regulatory reforms increasing trustee‐directors’ duties effectively address the conflicts of interest inherent in related party service provider arrangements.
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