{"title":"以无限和超越或，避免无限在安全协议分析","authors":"J. Heather, Steve A. Schneider","doi":"10.1145/1141277.1141359","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We investigate conditions under which an infinite set of atomic messages can be replaced with one or two values without affecting the correctness of a security protocol. The work is conducted using the strand spaces formalism, but the results apply to all protocol analysis techniques, and should be of particular value to those using model checking.The implications of the central result are discussed.","PeriodicalId":269830,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2006-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"To infinity and beyond or, avoiding the infinite in security protocol analysis\",\"authors\":\"J. Heather, Steve A. Schneider\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/1141277.1141359\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We investigate conditions under which an infinite set of atomic messages can be replaced with one or two values without affecting the correctness of a security protocol. The work is conducted using the strand spaces formalism, but the results apply to all protocol analysis techniques, and should be of particular value to those using model checking.The implications of the central result are discussed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":269830,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2006-04-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/1141277.1141359\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1141277.1141359","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
To infinity and beyond or, avoiding the infinite in security protocol analysis
We investigate conditions under which an infinite set of atomic messages can be replaced with one or two values without affecting the correctness of a security protocol. The work is conducted using the strand spaces formalism, but the results apply to all protocol analysis techniques, and should be of particular value to those using model checking.The implications of the central result are discussed.
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